PREFACE

IDEOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY: A WEBSITE

This website is devoted to the examination of political ideologies and their impact on the formulation of public policy in the United States. It is a far too long book that began as a series of seven journal articles published in *Policy Sciences* (Grafton & Permaloff 2001, 2005a), *The Social Science Journal* (Grafton & Permaloff 2005b, 2008; Permaloff & Grafton 2006), *Public Choice* (Grafton & Permaloff 2004), and *The Journal of Political Ideologies* (Permaloff & Grafton 2003).

Roughly speaking, the time frame covered by this project is 1961-2012. During these years the United States faced numerous domestic problems, and today many of them remain only partly resolved. Most of the policy initiatives proposed to resolve these problems were developed or heavily influenced by liberals and conservatives. We argue that more often than is commonly supposed, initiatives grew out of liberal-conservative consensus. Even without ideological agreement at the initiative formulation stage, as initiatives were implemented, liberal movement toward conservative positions or conservative movement toward liberal positions frequently occurred. Complete and unchanging liberal-conservative conflict in a given policy area is relatively uncommon despite widely accepted descriptions of the national policy environment as deadlocked in the 1950s-1960s and polarized in the first decade of the 21st Century.

Neither initial consensus nor later narrowing of ideological policy gaps should be surprising; liberalism and conservatism evolved from the same intellectual heritage. The version of conservatism developed in the late 1700s by British parliamentarian Edmund Burke would not have been possible outside of the intellectual framework begun by John Locke and other liberals. In addition, a perspective on economics often called classical liberalism merged (uncomfortably) with conservatism in the 1950s and 1960s. More than a century ago, classical liberalism was simply ordinary liberalism.

This study's central and immodest objective is to determine what policy initiatives targeting major domestic problems have been effective and worthwhile and which have not. We also seek to understand what decision processes contribute to success or failure and whether ideologically based debates over policy initiatives alter not only the policy debated but the ideological values themselves

Initiatives Included in this Study

We examine all of the major initiatives that were the subject of committee hearings in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1961-2009 as listed in the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) database funded by the National Science Foundation (see Appendix). We define an initiative as a policy departure or an attempt to nullify an ongoing policy. So, for example, we exclude KeyID 39106 (1969) (each set of hearings has a KeyID number in the PAP database) described in the database as covering "general economic problems in the US," because these hearings do not concern or at least focus on an initiative. On the other hand, we include KEYID 39119 (1970) which is described as "extend the standby wage and price controls" because Nixon era wage and price controls constituted a widely debated policy departure that carried implications for later petroleum price controls. Most of the initiatives included in this study were the subjects of many hearings over years or even decades; in our descriptions of initiatives we include many events that occur before, between, and after the hearings listed in the Appendix. We list only one hearing and one KEYID number for each initiative in the Appendix in order to identify our subject.

This study describes policy formulation for 52 domestic policy initiatives (see Table P.1), reduced from the longer list in the Appendix. We include only major initiatives. Of course, what is major and what is not is to some degree a matter of judgment, and we are probably excluding initiatives that readers regard as important and including others that readers view as trivial. As this site evolves we will add and perhaps delete initiatives in response to reader feedback and interaction. For the present, our operational definition of major initiatives is that they were the subjects of multiple editorials over a number of years in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, and/or *National Review*. Our reasons for using these

particular publications are presented in a later chapter.

Table P.1 Initiatives Included in this Study in Rough Chronological Order

Approx. year	Initiative	Primary tool(s) for enacting initiative
1961	Almost automatic support for increased regular public school spending	Bureaucracy at local level
1961	Support agribusiness subsidies	Leg & bureaucracy
1961	Support regulation of transportation	Leg & bureaucracy
1961	Almost automatic support for increased welfare spending	Leg & fed & state bureaucracy
1961	Support antitrust	Leg & bureaucracy
1961	Enact & expand health insurance	Leg & bureaucracy
1961	Enhance nontraditional energy sources	Leg & bureaucracy
1961	Initiate & support workfare	Leg & bureaucracy at local, state, & fed
1961	Enact gun control	Leg & police
1961	Initiate & support urban renewal	Leg & bureaucracy at local, state, & fed
1961	Ban prayer in pub schools	Simple court orders & leg
1961	Ban religious iconography on government property	Simple court orders & leg
1961	Expand rights of those accused of crimes	Simple court orders & leg
1961	Extend freedom of protected speech	Simple court orders & leg
1961	Extend freedom of unprotected speech	Simple court orders & leg
1961	Extend privacy rights (excluding abortion)	Simple court orders & leg

Table P.1 Initiatives Included in this Study in Rough Chronological Order

Approx. year	Initiative	Primary tool(s) for enacting initiative
1961-1965	Protect voting rights	Simple court orders & leg & bureaucracy
1961	Increase minimum wage	Simple leg
1961	Basic approaches to reducing crime	Various
1964	End racial discrimination	Simple court orders & leg
1966	Reduce gun control	Delete laws
1969	Enact affirmative action	Court orders, leg, & bureaucracy
1969	Enhance immigration control	Leg & bureaucracy
1970	Enact wage & price controls	Leg & exec orders
1971	Enact & support consumer protection	Leg & bureaucracy
1971	End wage discrimination	Simple court orders & leg
1971	End discrimination based on mental & physical	Simple court orders & leg
1971	End discrimination against women	Simple court orders & leg
1971	End discrimination based on sexual preference	Simple court orders & leg
1972	Expand freedom of information	Leg
1973	Reduce barriers to international trade	Leg
1973	Enact energy price controls & rationing	Leg & bureaucracy
1973	Legalize abortion	Simple court order & leg
1975	Initiate & support Earned Income Tax Credit	Leg & existing bureaucracy
1975	Initiate & support pollution control	Leg & state & fed bureaucracy

Table P.1 Initiatives Included in this Study in Rough Chronological Order

Approx. year	Initiative	Primary tool(s) for enacting initiative
1978	Require use of gasohol plus corn subsidies	Leg & bureaucracy
1979	Enact deinstitutionalization of mentally ill	Court orders
1979	Prevent large business failures-subsidize economic activity	Leg
1979	Initiate & support Superfund	Leg & bureaucracy
1979	Reduce global warming	Leg & bureaucracy
1985	End affirmative action	Delete laws & reverse court rulings
1985	Enact & extend Family & Medical Leave Act	Leg & bureaucracy
1986	Protect workplace safety	Leg & bureaucracy
1990	Enact bank & financial deregulation	Delete laws & reverse court rulings
1990	Initiate & support school vouchers	Leg & complex adaptive systems
1992	Provide low interest & low down payment mortgages	Leg & bureaucracy
1992	Initiate & support charter schools	Leg & complex adaptive systems
1999	Enact & support Brownfields	Leg & bureaucracy
2001	Ban federal aid for stem cell research	Executive order
2001	Enact & support No Child Left Behind	Leg & state & federal bureaucracy
2009	Enact Cash for Clunkers	Leg & bureaucracy
2009	Restart federal aid for stem cell research	Executive order

Many of the hearings in the PAP focus on narrowly defined matters, so in Table P.1 we combine them into broader, more

manageable categories. Other PAP hearings were so wide ranging that they were also excluded, and PAP descriptions are quite sketchy, so we might have missed some that fit our definition of major initiative. Our results are not based on statistical analysis except for a few rudimentary roll call vote studies of individual initiatives, so missing a number of major initiatives should not affect our conclusions materially.

The 52 initiatives from PAP include banning federal aid to stem cell research and restarting federal aid to stem cell research. We could treat policy for stem cell research as either one initiative or two; the study's conclusions are not affected by this decision. Either way, we would discuss efforts to ban federal aid to stem cell research and the subsequent end of the ban. Similarly, the initiative listed as "Enact and expand health insurance" encompasses Kennedy administration attempts to enact health insurance, the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in the Johnson administration, the abortive attempt at comprehensive health care in the Clinton administration, the enactment of prescription drug coverage in the second Bush administration, and passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in the Obama administration.

PAP initiatives were supplemented with ones that were widely debated but which do not have clear counterparts in the PAP. Appendix KEYID entries for them are labeled "NA." Examples include banning prayer in public schools and supporting the regulation of transportation. The latter refers to railroad, trucking, and airline route and rate regulations long in place but still intensely debated as of 1961. In the 1960s and 1970s these regulations were attacked and defended and fit both types of initiatives covered in our definition: policy departures (albeit ones formulated well before 1961) and attempts to nullify an ongoing policy (occurring after 1961).

To document our findings we must provide sometimes detailed descriptions of the initiatives in Table P.1. The result is very lengthy much too long to be publishable as a bound book. In addition, many of the initiatives that we examine are the subjects of current debate. A bound work would be partially obsolete before it was printed. Our plan is to periodically update the chapters containing descriptions of

policy initiatives and to add short essays on specialized topics as current events and reader feedback warrant. This is the first update.

Initiative Formulation

We view initiative formulation or nullification as conflict among ideologues (liberals and conservatives) and self-interested groups. Initiative advocates deploy moral/value theories and policy theories. A moral/value theory explains why the initiative is worthwhile, that is, good or valuable. A policy theory spells out how the initiative will take us from the present to a more desirable future. An initiative that achieves objectives specified by the policy theory is said to be effective. An initiative can be worthwhile and effective or worthless and effective (it achieves goals that are not worth achieving) or worthwhile and ineffective (it fails to achieve good or valuable goals) or worthless and ineffective. Much of this study examines how ideologues and interest groups determine whether initiatives are worthwhile and effective or any of the other three possibilities.

Self-interest and Ideology

There is a long standing tension between explanations of political behavior as motivated by self-interest or ideology. Self-interest portrayed as the only motive of political behavior extends back to Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It is featured in the classic interest group works of Arthur Bentley (1967) and David Truman (1960) and appears as a largely unexamined assumption in more recent interest group studies (e.g., Tsujinaka & Pekkanen 2007; Evanson 2008). It also remains a popular idea among other scholars (e.g., Tullock 1965; Buchanan 1989; Buchanan & Tullock 1967; Bowler, Donovan, & Karp 2006; DeMesquita 2009) as well as most journalists who report on politics. Self-interest seems to be an intuitively correct way to explain events in government, but its meaning is often unclear or circular because it is frequently defined to encompass all behavior. Moreover, self-interested behavior is difficult to separate from behavior motivated by something else, although if self-interest is defined as being all encompassing, there is nothing else (Mansbridge 1990, 254-263; Holmes 1990, 269; Hylland 1992, 52). In the first chapter we explore this problem in

some depth. We conclude that a definition of self-interest developed by David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk (1990, 148) helps identify political behavior as self-interested or non self-interested. They characterize self-interest as having a: "(1) short-to-medium term impact...on the (2) material well-being of the individual's own personal life (or that of his or her immediate family)." This definition excludes: "(1) long-term self-interest; (2) nonmaterial aspects of well-being (e.g., spiritual contentment, self-esteem, social adjustment, social status, or feelings of moral righteousness); and (3) interests that affect the well-being of the individual's group but not that of the specific individual..." The exclusions fall mostly in the realm of non self-interested behavior and include ideology (Fowler & Kam 2007; Frimer & Walker 2009; Lau & Heldman 2009).

The U.S. Congress makes a useful environment within which to think about and observe self-interest and ideology since the effects of congressional district or state characteristics on roll call votes can be measured. Characteristics of congressional districts or states such as economics, race, and urbanization are usually thought to be indicative of self-interest.

Practicing politicians, journalists, and political scientists typically turn first to self-interest as an explanation of the policy- formulation process (including the formulation of initiatives) in Congress or elsewhere in government. However, we will see in the first chapter that scholars whose primary concern is self- interest have produced surprisingly little understanding of policy formulation beyond obvious observations that, for example, a member of Congress representing the Detroit, Michigan area is probably seeking federal assistance for the U.S. auto industry or the City of Detroit more out self-interest than any other motive. Some who explain policy-formulation entirely by self-interest also find that bureaucrats try to maximize the size of their budgets, an observation typically not requiring any particular analytical perspective.

Although policy formulation in the federal government can partly be explained as the interaction of self-interested groups, usually a more comprehensive explanation can be attained by adding ideology to self-interest. The vast majority of political activists and

government officials in the United States are liberals or conservatives. Ideologues, a term employed in this study without the negative connotations often associated with it, believe that the public policy prescriptions they develop will advance society as a whole.

We define an ideology as an action oriented model of people and society (Parsons 1951, 349; Drucker 1974, 43; Mullins 1972, 510; Freeden 2003, 32). The phrase "action oriented" refers to the directions contained in ideologies for how issues should be resolved. A model is a simplification of reality or a generalization. Simplifications are necessary because most political questions are very complex, and no one can think about them without reducing them to their basic elements.

Other terms surrounding ideology and self-interest must also be defined. As we use it, the word politics means a process of conflict resolution in a society. Conflict has its origins in racial differences, class divisions, geography, natural resource shortages, and many other sources. Conflict is a part of life everywhere. In the world of politics conflict resolution rarely means conflict ending. At its most successful, conflict resolution results in a temporary reduction in the intensity of conflict. Political issues and the conflict they engender can endure for many years, decades, and even centuries.

David Easton (1968, 430) defined politics as the "interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society..." Authority refers to the legitimate use of power. Power maybe defined as the ability to get someone to do something they would not ordinarily do (Dahl 1957, 202-203). The values in Easton's definition may be monetary, material, or non material such as religious freedom or privacy. Some allocation of values is performed by the marketplace, but government is uniquely the realm of legitimated power backed by the potential or actual application of force. Political ideologies specify how priorities should be placed on values and how conflict should be resolved through governmental action.

Someone who appears to be an ideologue may in fact be entirely selfless, entirely selfish, or a mixture of the two; we can never be sure. However, there is a valid distinction between ideological behavior and behavior that is self-interested. To form educated

hypotheses regarding which kind of motive is in play, we can observe such phenomena as the content of political ideologies, the characteristics of a political actor's support base, and how policy positions relate to ideologies and a political base.

The first chapter is devoted to how ideology and self-interest affect policy formulation. We review theories and data gathered in public opinion surveys and congressional roll call voting studies regarding the importance of ideology and self-interest. Public opinion data indicate that a relatively small minority of the public thinks about issues in an informed, systematic manner within an ideological framework. However, that minority includes influential political elites. Members of the U.S. House and Senate and their core supporters are especially inclined toward ideological thinking as well as systematic self-interested thought. Polling data also reveal significant but far from dominant class-based (self- interested) voting among the general public. Statistical analyses of congressional roll call voting reveal influence by self-interest and ideology. Self-interest is measured by indicators that vary depending on particular issues. For example, a study of Senate voting on coal strip mining regulations uses a measure of a state's reliance on the coal industry among many other indicators (Kalt & Zupan 1984). Ideology is commonly gauged by ratings of legislators issued by ideological lobbying groups most notably the liberal activist organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Each year the ADA selects key legislative votes (in recent decades 20 per year in each chamber) deemed important. A legislator with an ADA rating of 100 casts votes consistent with ADA's liberal positions. A rating of zero represents opposition to ADA positions and those with such ratings are usually characterized as conservatives. Instead of ADA scores, the strip mining study used the ratings of an environmental group called the League of Conservation Voters. Explanations of voting on strip mining that relied entirely on economic self-interest were adequate, but accounts that added ideology to economic self-interest were much more complete. This general finding has been repeated by other studies using a variety of methodologies many of which are described in the first chapter.

NOMINATE (Nominal Three-Step Estimation), an analytical

technique developed by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal (2007), is regarded by some as an alternative to scoring reported by ideological groups such as the ADA. We will explore the uses of the two approaches in a later chapter, but for now we will confine our discussion to the ADA system.

We should note that examples in this study are often drawn from Congress because it is the center of policy formulation in the United States and because many scholars concerned with self- interest and ideology have used congressional roll call votes as subjects. However, this is not a study of Congress or congressional roll call analysis.

An understanding of the impact of ideology on policy-formulation requires an objective estimate of the ideological positioning of particular policies. Helpful as ADA ratings are, they are somewhat limited. The ADA bases its scoring on only a few House and Senate votes each year, and the organization's explanations of its positions are extremely brief. In published research we established that there is a strong positive relationship between ADA scores and the editorial positions of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* and a strong negative relationship between ADA positions and the *Wall Street Journal* and *National Review* magazine (Permaloff & Grafton 2006). We updated this work to 2010, and the results are unchanged. The ADA, *Times*, and *Post* are barometers of liberalism and the *Journal* and *National Review* of conservatism. The reasons for choosing these four publications are discussed in the third chapter.

The reader might wonder why we do not use histories of liberalism and conservatism and works by liberal and conservative theorists to gauge the ideological orientation of policy positions. The many histories of liberalism and conservatism characterize both ideologies with surprising consistency from their origins in the 1600s until the 1960s. From that decade to the present, historians and political theorists disagree about how to classify major liberal and conservative thinkers, how to interpret their works, and whether particular theorists are important. Some of these scholars are participants in intra-ideological debates that they purport to describe, making them unreliable guides. Even worse from our perspective,

most ideological theorists and historians of ideology ignore public policy. The second chapter describes these problems in some detail.

ADA scores and the editorials of our four barometer publications allow us to locate policy initiatives as liberal, conservative, or somewhere between, but we also need models of liberalism and conservatism that simplify these complex ideologies so that we can study their public policy implications without losing important detail. In published studies (Permaloff & Grafton 2003; Grafton & Permaloff 2004) we documented the validity of two such models, one developed by Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Jerry Goldman (1992) (JBG), and another that we originated in part and that we described in published work (Grafton & Permaloff 2001).

The JBG model is based on the idea that liberalism and conservatism consist of three core values: equality, freedom, and order. The two sides value all three but rank them differently. A liberal tends to favor equality over freedom and freedom over order; a conservative tends to favor freedom over equality and order over freedom. The JBG model is useful, but it nearly ignores economics and business. Our model, which concentrates on business and economics, is based on ways that liberals and conservatives respond to instances of faux market failure that we call market misbehavior and cases of true market failure that we label market breakdown (Grafton & Permaloff 2001).

Effective and Worthwhile Initiatives

One of our central concerns is what makes an initiative effective and worthwhile. The third chapter explores what it means to say that an initiative has those qualities. The first place that social scientists might look for answers is the voluminous policy literatures surrounding individual initiatives including voting rights, abortion, racial discrimination, affirmative action, charter schools, regular public schools, welfare, urban renewal, gun control, international trade, and many others. Helpful as much of this work is, it does not provide easily interpreted answers. Policy analysts sometimes convey the impression that their work is scientifically objective, but policy studies often more closely resemble shells fired at an opposing ideological or self-interested side. Mark Bovens and Paul tHart (1996) alert us to the subtleties of defining an initiative's objectives

and establishing a time frame for evaluation. Bias is, of course, another problem. In their study of welfare policy T. R. Marmor, J. L. Mashaw, and P. L. Harvey (1992) propose a cautionary rule: "Ideology drives analysis." We amend their rule to read: Ideology and self-interest drive analysis. Debates among ideologues and self-interested groups supplement policy studies and ironically allow us to judge whether an initiative is effective and worthwhile with at least some objectivity.

Implementation Tools, Organization Theory, and Complexity Theory

Initiative sponsors address policy problems with a relatively small array of implementation tools:

- simple legislation or a simple executive order that prohibits or allows a given behavior;
- simple court rulings that prohibit or allow a given behavior; competition in a market or market-like environment;
- incentives such as tax credits or deductions; centralized and of necessity complicated federal bureaucracies or federal government/state government bureaucracies that distribute scarce resources or regulate behavior on a day-to-day basis; and
- federal government/state government police entities created to maintain order.

These tools and associated definitions are introduced in the fourth chapter. Liberals and conservatives are inclined to use different combinations of them. We try to explain these preferences and whether the choice of devices has an impact on initiative effectiveness and whether an initiative is worthwhile.

This list of implementation tools and the likelihood of ideologically motivated preferences among them requires us to consider organization theory, complexity theory, and the theory of subgovernments. Scholars in several social science fields have for more than a century been studying the effectiveness of various government organizational structures. Most notably, sociologist Max Weber (1958) formally described modern centralized government bureaucracies that supplanted personalized or partisan arrangements used in Europe and the United States before and during the early

stages of the Industrial Revolution. Weber (and to a lesser degree American political scientist and later president Woodrow Wilson) observed, codified, and promoted the development of a new approach to organizing the executive branch that featured bureaucracies made up of technically competent staff chosen by objective standards, not political party or personal connections (Wilson 1997). Officials in the new bureaucracies were to be constrained by laws or administrative regulations, according to Weber's specifications. Bureaucracies would be organized hierarchically as defined by law and regulation.

When Weber and Wilson wrote more than a century ago, it appeared that chain of command, hierarchical bureaucracies staffed by technical experts were the only alternative to the spoils system and other personalized approaches to staffing government. However, as the complexity of economic systems and societies increased, it became apparent that Weber's model bureaucracy was in some applications almost as inadequate as the personalized and politicized systems it replaced.

It is widely accepted that Weber's model bureaucracy stands at one end of a continuum with open, democratic, or organic (names vary among authors) organizations at the other. Open organizations are by definition less hierarchical and more fluid. Weber's bureaucracy is best suited to accomplishing routine tasks in a stable environment, a description that does not fit many federal programs. Scholars have observed that hierarchical bureaucracies do a poor job of evaluating feedback from their environments because incoming information is often distorted as it travels through many organizational layers. Even when changes in circumstances are correctly evaluated, these organizations' adaptability to change is often described as low. The common criticism of armies as prepared to fight the last war instead of the next is a good example of this phenomenon. We will see that often bureaucracies do not operate alone that they are part of what is sometimes called a subgovernment (an earlier term was iron triangle) consisting of the bureaucracy together with interest groups and congressional committees. Theoretically, this structure may be more or less rigid or responsive than a bureaucracy on its own (if such an entity exists).

Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker (1961) among others noted the inability of hierarchical bureaucracies to handle novel problems. They offered what they called an organic model organization characterized by communication flowing in all directions instead of up and down with the content of that communication consisting of consultation more than command and control. We would expect that the organic government agency would be relatively well suited to responding to changing circumstances if such an organization could be made to function, but we know of few operating examples among federal agencies. Burns and Stalker cautioned that, while organic organizations are not supposed to operate in a vertical chain of command mode, they are nevertheless stratified, making them, in our view, all too similar to classical Weberian bureaucracies. The organic model is probably a theoretical and practical dead end at least for governments.

In some public policy areas complexity theory offers a partial way past the rigidity of the Weberian model and organic model organizations that resemble Weberian bureaucracies. Complexity theory spans many physical and social sciences and devotes particular attention to complex adaptive systems (CAS). A CAS consists of autonomous agents, no central control, and adaptation by each agent to changing circumstances. A market economy is an example as is an ecological system such as a lake. In every interaction the agents in a CAS obtain information regarding whether they are better or worse off and change their behavior to increase their well-being.

A school district can be an example of a CAS. School district agents include administrators, teachers, and staff of regular public schools, charter schools (a kind of public school), private schools, and parents of school children. In our example parents whose children are not learning at what the parents regard as an acceptable level in a regular public school, charter school, or private school may shift children to other venues including home schooling. Agents acting according to their own (or in this example their children's) interests improve the quality of the entire system. Poor schools and educational methodologies of any kind are abandoned and good ones thrive. The result is improvement for the school district as a whole. This model does not assume the inherent superiority of any

particular kind of school, but it does assert the superiority of school choice and competition over no choice and control of a school district by a regular public school monopoly. For this example school district to function as a CAS, parents must be free to move their children within the system. The kinds of adjustments possible when alternatives are available are contrasted with what may or may not occur when parents, dissatisfied with regular school quality, try to influence an elected board of education which then if it so decides sends appropriate orders through a Weberian chain of command to a school superintendent downward to each individual school and its instructors.

The first two implementation tools listed above consisting of simple legislation/executive orders or simple court rulings, are frequently used. In the fourth chapter we tease a definition of the word simple out of the complexity theory literature. Initiatives implemented with simple legislation/executive orders or court rulings that prohibit or allow a given behavior tend to be effective. Roe v. Wade is an example. Although the impact of Roe has been eroded by state-level counter-initiatives sponsored by some conservatives, it remains an example of an effective initiative. We know that Roe is effective since liberals defend it because it is effective and conservative opponents attack it for the same reason. By the way, this is an example of how ideology can be used objectively to evaluate initiative effectiveness.

Many problems are inherently complicated and require continuing implementation by technical experts employing government authority. Throughout much of government centralized Weberian bureaucracies or centralized federal bureaucracies partnered with centralized state government bureaucracies are used with mixed results to manage such programs. Incentives such as tax credits or deductions are also commonly employed, and competition in a market or market-like environment (a complex adaptive system) is sometimes utilized. Liberals and conservatives exhibit noticeable preferences among these approaches, a theme that will recur throughout the study.

Moral/Value Theories and Policy Theories

Part of our thesis is that an effective initiative that is worthwhile

must be supported by moral/value theories and policy theories that are consistent with ideological core beliefs. Ideologically inconsistent initiatives signal that there is a problem with the initiative, the ideology, or both. In the fifth chapter we examine cases of ideological consistency and inconsistency. For example, at the beginning of the time period of this study in 1961 liberal ideologues were long standing opponents of racial discrimination. This position is consistent with the liberal primary emphasis on equality and its secondary emphasis on freedom. Similarly, conservatives were predictably more concerned than liberals with disorder associated with civil rights demonstrations, potential disruptions of government and society that might be caused by the Civil Rights Act, and what they saw as a dangerous increase in federal power vis-a-vis the states. This difference in emphasis taken alone was entirely consistent on the part of both liberals and conservatives. But for many years conservatives ignored racial discrimination in the South which is to say that they paid little attention to gross violations of core conservative values of freedom and equality before the law. Furthermore, segregation and other elements of racial discrimination were themselves examples of disorder in the form of government sponsored disorder. Overall, during the civil rights era, conservatives were ideologically inconsistent, if not unprincipled.

In addition to studying ideological consistency and inconsistency, the fifth chapter will examine agreement and disagreement between ideologues and normally allied interest groups. More often than not, ideologues and their interest group allies support one another's initiatives, but occasionally disagreements arise. Such differences are enlightening because allies only split for important reasons. Nearly always, the pivot point of such divisions is self-interest versus the public interest orientation of ideologues.

One of the most notable examples of ideologue-interest group discord arose in the field of primary and secondary education. We cover education policy even though primary and secondary schools are mostly the responsibility of local and state governments. At the beginning of the time period of this study education policy was debated nationally, and liberals had been long-time supporters of increased local, state, and federal spending on regular public

schools. Conservatives opposed most funding increases, and they especially disliked federal support of public schools. However, since the launch of the Soviet Union's satellite Sputnik in 1957, liberals have been increasingly critical of regular public school quality especially in the home cities of our two liberal barometer newspapers. Indeed, some New York Times and Washington Post editorials on the topic of public school quality were almost indistinguishable from those in the Wall Street Journal and National Review both of which have been critical of regular public schools. Teachers unions and public school administrators have consistently denied that there is anything wrong with regular public schools or at least anything that cannot be alleviated with more funding. The long standing and growing disagreement between liberals and their normal allies suggests that something is amiss with public schools and teachers and/or their relationships with liberals. Glaringly poor standardized test scores and all too common school violence confirms that picture. The liberal- teachers union split illuminates slowly changing liberal- conservative disagreement over conservative school choice initiatives such as charter schools and vouchers for private schools with liberals increasingly favoring these conservative reforms or opposing them less vigorously than they once did.

Logically, the moral/value theories and policy theories that ideologues and self-interested groups deploy in their advocacy of initiatives are separate and distinct. While the two kinds of theories are separable in principle, we will see in the sixth chapter that in practice they are inextricably linked. This inseparability is especially noticeable when ideologues implement an initiative meant to support a core value but which instead undermines it and damages other core values as well. The recent liberal Cash for Clunkers program is a good example. This small short-lived initiative was intended to improve air quality by replacing old, low mileage cars with new, higher mileage vehicles, although some observers suspected that it was partly intended as a favor to the U.S. auto industry and the United Auto Workers. In any event, destroying many useful cars was itself environmentally damaging, because the environmental cost of building the cars (or more precisely the remaining value of the cars), such as mining the metals used in them, was wasted. We have seen

no evidence that the net impact of this initiative was helpful to the environment. In addition, the program reduced the number of used cars thus increasing the cost of remaining ones and hurting potential buyers many of whom were economically disadvantaged.

In addition to ideological consistency, effective and worthwhile initiatives require thoughtfulness. This means that there is a considered moral/value theory and a policy theory linking ideological values and the empirical world. Urban renewal serves as an example of a thoughtless moral/value theory and equally thoughtless policy theory. The value theory behind urban renewal was that, in the words of two pioneering liberal urban renewal theorists and advocates, "slums and blighted areas" should be eliminated (Greer & Hansen 1941, 3). Those who favored urban renewal assumed (probably without being aware that they were making an assumption) that everyone could identify a slum and that razing it was beneficial. This is the essence of a thoughtless moral/value theory. The implementation of urban renewal as it was designed and articulated by liberals called for the forced relocation of residents. Many liberals saw this as a favor to residents who were being saved from living in squalor, a term commonly used in the program's early years. There would follow roughly a decade of demolition and the construction of what quickly became either high rise ghettoes or housing far beyond the financial reach of the previous residents. In fairness, when the high rise public housing projects were being built liberals sincerely believed that new residents were being provided modern new housing that constituted a substantial improvement. Today conservatives and most liberals agree that urban renewal did not benefit many who needed affordable housing which is to say that it was ineffective. Indeed, in many instances it was destructive. Urban renewal policy theory was as thoughtless as its moral/value theory, an assertion that will be documented in a later chapter. This is another example of policy evaluation being facilitated by ideological debate and then consensus.

Important Debates

Throughout this study we use ideological and interest group policy debates mixed with the work of social scientists and occasionally physical scientists to judge whether an initiative is

effective and worthwhile. Sometimes liberals and conservatives broadly agree on initiative content. Even when they do not, one side frequently moves toward the other as the debate continues and new evidence appears. When there is movement, the gap does not always close because both sides may be moving; however the motion is indicative of how the initiative is being evaluated by the body politic. Of course, this is not to say that liberal-conservative agreement guarantees that an initiative is effective and worthwhile. Furthermore, even seemingly permanent ideological gaps exemplified by gun control and the minimum wage define issues and energize productive debates between opposing social scientists.

Near the end of this study we examine ideologically inconsistent, thoughtless, and ineffective initiatives that were not worthwhile. Ideologues promoting these initiatives often exhibit tunnel vision, akin to Irving Janis' (1982) groupthink, as they concentrate on a single value and often a distorted or even inverted interpretation of that single value inconsistent with the history of the ideology. Urban renewal is a good example. Liberals concentrated on equality with order a secondary consideration and freedom ignored completely. As it developed, both equality and order were turned upside down by urban renewal. The poor were expelled from slums which were replaced by crime ridden high rise ghettos or unaffordable luxury dwellings. Liberals often blamed local governments and real estate developers for what they saw as the distortion of their ideal of urban renewal, but local governments and real estate developers were an integral part of urban renewal as it was designed by liberals. Liberals accused developers of wanting to rid their properties of the poor and minorities and doubtless in many cases that charge is valid. But all of this was easily predictable, and liberals continued to support urban renewal after these patterns were clearly evident. Sometimes a kind of frenzy seems to take over one side or the other as it ignores everything but one distorted element of an initiative.

Effective and worthwhile decisions are more likely to come when liberal, conservative, and interest group perspectives are openly considered and debated, preferably over a period of years, before a policy initiative is acted upon. Data gathered and publicized by liberals, conservatives, and interest groups can be an important part

of these debates. Data, albeit presented in a biased manner, have played important roles in many policy debates since 1961. The consideration of multiple values, contrary policy theories, and disquieting data eventually changed positions of liberals toward conservative positions and conservatives toward liberal positions, although those changes sometimes required a long time to occur. What we are describing is not an amorphous middle path between liberalism and conservatism accompanied by treacly sentiments to the effect that we should all get along, reach across the aisle, or rise above. The differing perspectives of the two sides and extended debates of an initiative's merits contribute to the formulation of effective and worthwhile initiatives.

Another factor complicates liberal-conservative conflict resolution. Most domestic initiatives can be regarded as concerning business and economics or not. For example, freedom of speech, privacy, voting rights, and prayer in public schools do not primarily concern business and economics. Debates in these fields are most clearly understood using the JBG model. In contrast, antitrust and pollution fall almost entirely in the realm of business and economics and debate in these areas are best comprehended using our market breakdown model. Which category an initiative occupies depends on the debate that surrounds it especially in the public statements of its sponsors and opponents and the editorial pages of our four barometer publications.

A few initiatives fall into both categories. We expect that policy formulation will be different with initiatives of this sort than it would be with those that fit within one model or the other. For example, liberals might be inclined to think primarily in terms of one model and conservatives the other or perhaps both sides think in terms of both models. Either way, we suspect that liberals emphasize JBG values (especially equality) and conservatives stress market economics, and when this occurs they may talk past each other. And, in order to alter preexisting agreements reached through prior debates, ideologues at the extremes in either the liberal or conservative camp may attempt to restructure the debate using the other model. (For example, couching pollution debates in terms of equality of outcomes, not the market.) Imagine a spectrum ranging

from constructive liberal-conservative dialogues at one end resulting in change of one or both sides to liberal- conservative debates at the opposite end of the spectrum where neither side budges as each drones on, perhaps aware of the other side's positions but neither understanding the other. In some instances, such as enacting and modifying laws concerning freedom of information (where the value of freedom dominates both sides' thinking) liberals and conservatives conduct dialogues which are primarily consultative. In this case they mainly agree on the desirability of expanding freedom, and over the years dialogues have been primarily devoted to sorting out operational details. Increasing the minimum wage is an example at the opposite end of the consensus-conflict spectrum. In this case liberals think about the issue primarily as a matter of needing to enhance equality while conservatives see minimum wage laws interfering with the market's establishing salaries at levels appropriate to the skills of employees and hurting the employees who liberals are trying to help. The two sides are aware of each others' positions, but their public statements sound more like simultaneous monologues than dialogues or even debates.

Currently, politicians, the news media, and social scientists devote considerable attention to liberal-conservative polarization with increasingly extreme ideologues dominating the opposite ends of the spectrum. The result is said to be a near paralysis of Congress. Sarah Binder's (2003) book title *Stalemate* summarizes this thesis in one word and is typical of this literature. We do not disagree with this view, but we believe that insufficient attention is given to the substantial liberal-conservative agreement that can be observed throughout the time period of this study as well as the surprisingly frequent movement of one side toward the other. In part, congressional paralysis is probably exacerbated by House and Senate rules, party control of agendas, and sensational media coverage that stifle debate and discussion, but conflict resolution is not confined to Congress or even Washington, D.C.

Our comparatively sanguine perspective on ideological conflict may be a product of this study's coverage of policy initiatives over a half century time span. To get a sense of the differences between the 1960s and the present we examine policy formulation for health care

insurance ranging from the Kerr-Mills program enacted in 1960 and ending with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed in 2009.

The study concludes with guidelines for the formulation of effective and worthwhile policy initiatives. In the short run, the tunnel vision and distortion of single values that lead to the passage of ineffective and worthless initiatives will be immune to our recommendations, as will the tunnel vision and single value distortion that lead to opposition against effective and worthwhile initiatives. In the long run, it is conceivable that liberals and conservatives in the course of open debate will correct mistakes as they have done many times in the past half century.

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