CHAPTER II

LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM

Most definitions of ideologies can be characterized as either analytical or historical. Analytical definitions are based on some theory of politics. Such definitions are usually brief, simple and elegant but often eccentric and barely related to common usage. An example is Talcott Parsons' (1959, 25-29) classification of ideologies by attitudes toward change on a range marked by labels such as conservative and revolutionary. Parsons' ideological spectrum founders on the term conservative. For Parsons, conservative is synonymous with the phrase preservation of the status quo. The conservatism-as-preservation definition can be applied to any political setting and interpreted to mean that a conservative is a capitalist, communist, Muslim fundamentalist, or fascist depending on the particular time and place. This usage runs counter to common definitions of the term conservative which describe an ideology with strong democratic and free market lineages. Parsons' analytically derived notion of conservatism is meaningless when considered in this light. Probably all ideologies can often be found defending the status quo or advocating revolution.

Historical definitions are based on the thoughts of leading advocates of ideologies. Typically, these definitions adhere to common usage, but they are rarely tidy because ideologies change over time as their advocates mix theory and experience. Another disadvantage of historical definitions is that they are dependent on the definers' choices of representative advocates of a given ideology. Insofar as the liberalism and conservatism of the distant past are concerned, this is not a serious problem. Most authors regardless of their ideological orientations characterize liberalism and conservatism consistently from their respective origins until the 1960s. From the 1960s to the present, historians and political theorists disagree on how to classify major thinkers, how to interpret their works, and whether they are important. To understand

contemporary disagreements regarding liberalism and conservatism, we must first review their relatively uncontroversial early histories.

Liberalism

In 16th and 17th Centuries Europe political thinkers began questioning the authority of monarchs and the Church. They argued that each individual possessed natural rights that should remain outside the authority of the king or clerics (Hoover 1987, 14-18). Although a comprehensive history of liberalism should probably begin with Thomas Hobbes and his emphasis on the individual, a central theme in liberal political thought, Hobbes' conclusion that a dictatorship is required to stave off anarchy, separates him from the liberalism that flowered immediately after him (Hobbes 1909; Bay 1970, 28; Heineman 1994, 33-35). In two works published in 1689 John Locke, whose foundational importance to liberalism is undisputed, defended religious freedom, attacked royalty, and advocated limited versions of constitutional and democratic government (Eccleshall, Geoghegan, Jay, & Wilford 1984, 40). We will see that Locke's thought was also critical to the development of conservatism.

Individual freedom was central to Locke, but he considered and rejected a notion of freedom that had everyone entirely free and untethered by law (Locke 1960, 324). Such a condition would be a dangerous anarchy (p. 395). Civilized society and the cooperation that it requires entail constraints. Locke concluded: "Where there is no law, there is no freedom." (p. 348)

Locke advocated the rule of law with law formulated by a legislature and applied to everyone equally. The legislature represented the community as a whole (p. 402). He contrasted the rule of law with monarchy which carries the potential for uncertainty and arbitrariness (p. 324). Although Locke was far from being a democrat in a contemporary sense, his framework for governance was fundamentally democratic: government officials with authority granted by the community would apply the law uniformly (p. 367).

Locke recognized the need for a chief executive, but the chief executive would be part of the legislature and subordinate and

accountable to the legislature; the legislature would possess the authority to remove the chief executive (Locke 1960, 414- 415). Locke's government was in some sense representative, and no one could hold absolute power (Locke 1960, 345; Manent 1994, 48-49).

One of Locke's central themes was the importance of people being free to do whatever they chose with their property (Locke 1960, 287). His application of the word property was extremely broad by today's usage encompassing as it did "lives, liberties and estates." (p. 395) He also asserted that, as a matter of natural law, all people possessed equal rights, and since everyone was equal and independent, no one ought to harm another (pp. 287-289). Natural law and natural rights continued as a central element of liberalism from Locke to contemporary theorists such as Robert Nozick (1974) and Ronald Dworkin (1978). Government existed primarily to maintain order by enforcing the law when one person violates another's rights. Government's role should be that of an umpire settling disputes according to established rules (Locke 1960, 342).

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism, the idea that public policy should produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, was another element of liberalism. Like the theory of natural rights, the influence of this concept extends throughout most of the history of liberalism (Bentham 1776).

Utilitarianism forces us to consider the circumstances in which the individual should be required to sacrifice to benefit the community, and the tension between the individual and community remains a major source of disagreement within liberal ranks today. Jeremy Bentham (1781) who invented utilitarianism believed that a balance of pleasure and pain determined the direction public policy should take and that at least theoretically policy makers could measure and balance the two. Benefit-cost analysis, widely used today in business and governmental decision-making, is a descendant of utilitarianism. It need hardly be said that there is a huge difference between abstract discussions of pleasure and pain and actually measuring them, and this problem, clearly visible in

Bentham's work, remains as a major weakness of benefit-cost analysis.

Liberalism in the 1800s and early 1900s

Because government was the chief secular threat to individual freedom in the 1600s and 1700s, minimal government, democratic and independent of direct church authority, was a major liberal principle. Such a governmental role was consistent with the liberal economic theory, associated most commonly with Adam Smith (1776), that an economy relatively unfettered by government regulation would outperform any other economic system.

In the 1800s the spread of democracy produced a new threat to freedom. The problem was what Alexis de Tocqueville (1945), writing in the early nineteenth century, called democratic despotism. De Tocqueville saw that the popular majority could be as dictatorial as a king, a danger that Edmund Burke, the founder of conservatism, warned against in the late 1700s (see below). In the United States the major institutional protection against democratic despotism was a written constitution that required extraordinary majorities and considerable time and effort to amend together with institutional structures designed to divide authority within the federal government and between it and the states. Following Locke, American liberals regarded the widespread ownership of property as a way to divide economic power which when centralized is easily transformed into overarching political power (Manning 1976, 70).

As technology spawned factories with consequent public health hazards, new education needs, and other complications of modern urban life, liberals looked more positively toward an expanded government role in the economy. After the Civil War the United States experienced rapid economic development, industrialization, population growth, and social change. For example, in 1840 the United Kingdom's GDP was 1.5 times greater than that of the U.S., but by 1913 the UK's GDP was only 41 percent of the U.S. GDP (Gallman 1996, 5). Meanwhile, the percentage of the U.S. labor force engaged in manufacturing increased from 13.8 percent in 1860 to 22.1 percent in 1910 (Engerman & Sokoloff 1996, 380), and the

number of manufacturing establishments almost doubled in the same time period with this expansion accompanied by increases in productivity (Bolino 1966, 212). Many factories were built in cities, and in the years 1860-1910 the number of cities with populations exceeding 100,000 went from 9 to 50 (Glaab 1976, 100). Large oil, railroad, and meat packing companies became prominent, and many regarded them as monopolistic or predatory.

In 1887 the United States Congress responded to some of these problems with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the federal government's first regulatory commission. In the same spirit, the Sherman Anti-trust Act became law in 1890. Corporate and banking interests in the United States, after experiencing a number of economic downturns in the late 19th Century and desiring a reduction in the intensity of competition, supported several regulatory reforms advocated by Progressive era presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (Kolko 1963). These reforms included passage of the Meat Inspection Act (1906), the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914), Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), and amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act.

The new government activism of the late 1800s and early 1900s in the U.S. and similar developments in earlier years in England contradicted the dominant liberal theory of laissez faire (Heineman 1994, 91-107). In 1901 English liberal economist J. A. Hobson observed that it was unrealistic in a complex modern economy to think of the private and public sectors as separate, because no one could build wealth without societal assistance. Therefore, it was fair to regard some portion of economic output as a communal resource to provide a variety of welfare programs (Eccleshall, Geoghegan, Jay, & Wilford, 1984, 63-64). Hobson (1974, 74-77) even went so far as to liken British society to a hive or herd, similes far removed from liberal individualism and the liberal distinction between public and private sectors.

One of the market economy's most frightening qualities was its periodic depressions caused, Hobson and other economists believed,

by under consumption which in turn originated from a maldistribution of wealth. The poor lacked purchasing power, and the wealthy, who needed nothing, lacked the desire to use the purchasing power they held in abundance. The obvious solution was to extract surplus wealth from the rich and dispense it to those who needed it. Additional spending would then propel the economy forward. Robert Eccleshall, Vincent Geoghegan, Richard Jay, and Rick Wilford (1984, 64) observed that Hobson and thinkers of a similar bent repeatedly emphasized that it was not their intention to "impose an equality of income and wealth, and thereby stifle individual initiative." Instead, they wanted to provide equality of opportunity via public education and the provision of other public goods and programs to smooth destructive business cycles.

British political theorists toward the end of the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th reinforced Hobson's egalitarian endeavors. T. H. Green and L. T. Hobhouse are the most commonly cited, but there were several others as well (Freeden 1978, 16-18). Hobhouse began with John Locke's argument that freedom requires the rule of law (Hobhouse 1922, 91, 93). Hobhouse explained that freedom needs some restraint. Without it some people would be subjugated by others (Meadowcroft/Hobhouse 1994, 11). Because liberalism in the time of Locke had as its central opponent an authoritarian government and an equally authoritarian church, liberals in Locke's time favored a severely limited government (Meadowcroft/Hobhouse 1994, 26). Hobhouse noted that useful as the idea of laissez faire had been, it became irrelevant and even harmful as the Industrial Revolution developed. He described the mass movement of workers from agriculture to industry, and he decried the weak bargaining position of a lone individual facing a large corporation (Meadowcroft/Hobhouse 1994, 39-40; Adams 2001, 29).

As England passed legislation protecting workers and as workers organized, the nature of freedom and how it would be protected was rethought. In particular, under the theory of laissez- faire, government maintains law and order, helps enforce contracts, and little else. But, Hobhouse asked, should government perform these functions and no others? (Meadowcroft/ Hobhouse 1994, 42)

Hobhouse argued that when a worker bargains with a corporation, the corporation enjoys such a large advantage that the agreement struck is essentially forced: if an adequate wage cannot be agreed upon, the worker and his family will suffer privation, but the corporation can easily find a replacement. A fair negotiation between worker and employer requires a measure of equality. Under laissez faire a central government function is to prevent criminals from harming others thereby preserving freedom for the populace as a whole. So too, government enhances freedom by preventing corporations from taking advantage of their bargaining advantages in their dealings with workers (Meadowcroft/ Hobhouse 1994, 43).

The transition from the classical liberalism of Locke and Smith to the progressive movement initiated by Hobson, Green, Hobhouse, and others saw a broadening of the liberal conception of freedom from what is often called negative to positive freedom (Green 1986; Hobhouse 1911). This change provided intellectual license for the liberal advocacy of a more activist government than had been possible under the concept of freedom as only negative (Hobson 1974, 4). Freedom no longer meant just freedom from external constraints (negative freedom) especially those originating in government but an individual's freedom of motion–the ability to do what one wants (positive freedom) (Berlin 1984). We will see in later chapters that contemporary liberalism has completely accepted the combined notions of negative and positive freedom. Although conservatives continue actively to reject the notion of positive freedom, among liberals the distinction between the two freedoms is actively discussed by only a few theorists (Preston 1984).

From World War I and the New Deal to Vietnam

World War I brought a sharp increase in federal regulatory power in virtually every sector of the U.S. economy (Higgs 1987, 123- 158). The federal government established priorities, controlled prices, and took over some industries completely, although most war time authority was retracted after the war. World War I regulatory experiences served as a model for some of the federal government's responses to the Great Depression, the most severe economic

downturn in U.S. history. At its worst the unemployment rate reached at least 25 percent nationally. Thousands of banks and tens of thousands of farms and businesses failed. Its causes are still debated although excessive stock market speculation, an international trade war initiated by new tariffs and other protectionist measures, and unwise federal government fiscal policies are often cited. The Great Depression lasted throughout the 1930s, and recovery did not occur until after the U.S. entry into World War II. Production of war materials revitalized the economy, and the military absorbed the unemployed.

The New Deal combined the ideas of English economists such as Hobson, the nation's World War I experiences, and German social welfare programs as President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his liberal aides struggled to reverse the Depression. In many respects the New Deal with its party realignments, creation of welfare programs, expansion of economic regulatory activities, public works programs, and farm subsidies, marked the beginning of politics and government in the U.S. as it would be experienced for the rest of the 20th Century and into the 21st (Brinkley 1989, 86; Louchheim 1983). Many of FDR's first term programs were successful and popular as evidenced by their continued existence today in somewhat different forms (Grafton 1975 & 1983). However, FDR's most notable first term initiative failed.

The New Deal's first major comprehensive attack on the Depression was the National Recovery Administration (NRA) created in 1933 as part of the National Recovery Act. There appeared to be at least two incompatible theories behind the NRA's charter. One was that the Depression was caused by destructive competition among businesses. The other theory, antithetical to the first, was that businesses, far from tearing each other apart, conspired to impose unfairly high prices resulting in unnaturally low purchasing power and therefore unnecessarily low production levels. Advocates of both theories agreed that destructive competition or corporate conspiracy could be reduced by governmental regulation of major sectors of the economy. Reflecting the vacuous quality of the

thinking underlying its creation, the NRA issued codes setting complex, arbitrary, and ineffective rules of fair behavior for some 90 industry groups (Tugwell 1977, 80-82, 186-190; 240-245; Ferguson 1989, 17-18). In 1935 the agency was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court (*Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States*).

Among contemporary historians the NRA has few, if any, defenders. The agency represented a branch of liberalism, sometimes described as statist, which called for centralized bureaucratic control of major segments of the economy (Hamby 1973, 3). Statism in all its guises (left and right), already in tatters because of the NRA's failure, was wrecked by vicious dictatorships in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Liberals, some of whom were initially attracted by the potential of European command economies, were repelled by the destructive form those economies assumed when combined with all- powerful governments (Lawson 1971, 133). Even worse from the statist perspective, subsequent U.S. efforts at wartime planning demonstrated that centralized bureaucracies were often incapable of performing relatively simple tasks, let alone comprehensive economic management. If the NRA's failure, the malevolence of European statist governments, and unsuccessful U.S. wartime planning efforts were not enough to destroy statist liberalism (at least in the era of the Depression and WWII), the private sector's robust post-War recovery completed the demolition (Brinkley 1989, 93-111).

Although the political system rejected sweeping, economy- wide programs such as the NRA and centralized planning, it accepted more focused yet still large-scale devices such as Social Security, regulation of securities markets, agricultural price supports, legal recognition of labor unions, collective bargaining, and unemployment compensation. These programs, several of which required substantial bureaucracies for their operation, constituted a vast expansion in federal government authority (Hamby 1973, 3).

In their search for ways to avoid future economic downturns American liberals turned to relatively unintrusive economic tools

offered by the English economist John Maynard Keynes (Brinkley 1989, 108-109). In the *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936) Keynes maintained that full employment was best achieved not via governmentally managed industry, but with fiscal policy that would level the peaks and valleys of business cycles.

Classical liberalism and the new liberalism

By 1949 a new version of liberalism, distinct from the classical liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith, and different from statist liberalism, had emerged (Katznelson 1989, 189-195). The new liberalism was fully expressed in Democratic President Harry S. Truman's State of the Union Address of that year. Truman's Fair Deal program included a more progressive tax structure, repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act (a labor union regulatory statute perceived by most liberals as harmful to unions), a 74 cent per hour minimum wage, farm subsidies, expansion of federal electrical power production, expanded Social Security, national medical insurance, federal aid to education, expanded public housing, and civil rights. In spirit, if not in every detail, Truman's agenda remains as the liberalism of today.

Classical liberalism was not eliminated by the transformation in liberalism that began in the late 1800s and early 1900s and matured in the Truman years. Classical liberalism shifted to being a central element of contemporary conservatism. Unlike new liberals, classical liberals and conservatives do not accept the concept of positive freedom. They recognize only negative freedom defined as a condition under which a person is not interfered with by government or predatory individuals (Hayek 1960, 11). For classical liberals protection against predators is provided by government. Friedrich Hayek (1960, 16), a Nobel Prize winning economist and probably the most influential classical liberal political theorist of the 20th Century, defines positive freedom which he calls "liberty as power" as "the ability to satisfy our wishes, or the extent of the choices of alternatives open to us." For new liberals (henceforth just liberals) positive freedom for all can only be achieved by a proactive federal government.

Classical liberals regard excessive government as the only significant threat to freedom. They often criticize federal anti-poverty initiatives and other programs such as farm subsidies intended to assist businesses as threats to freedom. Today's liberals reject the classical liberal argument that freedom is threatened by welfare programs or business subsidies (Ritchie1902, 85; Eccleshall, Geoghegan, Jay, and Wilford 1984, 48-49). They accept capitalism, but they want government to at least partly ameliorate the inequality and instability that they believe results from the unfettered operation of the market economy (Hoover 1987, 63). Similarly, many business oriented conservatives, sometimes referred to as Chamber of Commerce conservatives, reject the classical liberal argument that freedom is threatened by government programs that assist businesses.

During the administration of Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, widely regarded as a moderate conservative, liberal Democrats in Congress continued expansion of federal programs that had begun with Roosevelt and Truman, but the Republican president probably slowed their rate of growth (Sundquist 1968, 385-417). Liberal intellectuals of this period devoted most of their energies to expanding New Deal and Fair Deal programs, and they promoted increases in federal power and the creation of new federal programs in the administrations of Democratic presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson (Grafton 1975; Aaron 1978, 26).

Post Vietnam War debates

Beginning with opposition to the Vietnam War that exploded during the Johnson Administration, liberal thinkers started a process of self-examination and debate that continues to the present (Young 1996). The topics and crisscrossing fault lines in that debate are many including race, poverty, feminism, value pluralism, political correctness, free speech, multiculturalism, censorship, postmodernism, individualism versus communitarianism, international trade, environmentalism, and consumerism. All of these topics contain subcategories. Steven Wall (2015, 14) reinforces this point observing that contemporary political philosophy

offers no single vision of liberalism partly because: "Political philosophers and theorists reach liberal political conclusions from many different starting points, and how they understand the nature of liberalism...is shaped by their starting points." Gregor McLennan (1995,78), discussing just elements of one corner of ideological theorizing on the left, listed the following starting points: "The new cultural politics of difference, the politics of diversity, the politics of identity, radical democracy, the new republicanism,...subaltern empowerment, lifestyle politics, [and] lifeworld politics..."

Although the subjects of these on-going, multi-level liberal debates can be listed, few can be separated or discussed alone without at least referring to others (Freeden 2001). For example, the feminism of the liberal Betty Friedan (1963) began as a variant of the civil rights movement and was initially regarded by some civil rights leaders as a distraction. Within roughly a decade women's rights and civil rights movements were united within liberalism. Later, some feminists were in part no longer in the liberal camp. For example, law professor Catherine MacKinnon (1993; 1995) was partially allied with the religious right in her willingness to use government power to outlaw what she regarded as anti-feminist pornography, but most liberals regard censorship as an unacceptable violation of the First Amendment (see also Maitra 2009).

Equality and social justice

John Rawls (1971; 1993) is often described as the most influential theorist of the post-Vietnam era of liberal debate. Whether he has changed liberal public policy prescriptions is not settled and may not be for some time, but he is probably the most widely discussed and debated liberal theorist of the past quarter century. Best known for his arguments on behalf of equality, Rawls observes that our personal characteristics such as intelligence, artistic ability, and beauty are given to us as a matter of chance. The central idea is that if we are, for example, said to deserve a high salary because of our great intelligence, and if our intelligence is only the result of luck, then we do not deserve the large pay check. Any differential in rewards would be unfair unless it can be shown that the least well

off are made better off by the differential (Rawls 1993, 271). This assertion is called the difference principle.

Many objections have been lodged against Rawls' formulation. Perhaps the most important is that he offers no way to measure the benefit to the poor of reward differentials. Classical liberals and conservatives argue that differentials are needed as incentives to creative people who develop new technologies and organize businesses that provide employment for others (Ackerly 2006, 76). No one can say with assurance that a reallocation of wealth will or will not diminish those incentives and benefit the least well off (Van Dyke 1995, 83-84). The only measure of the economic value of anything, including an individual's work, is provided by the market, and a reallocation of wealth to achieve greater equality damages the market's ability to assign dollar values to factors of production such as labor (Narveson 1997, 31).

It is indicative of the vagueness of the difference principle that Rawls is criticized from the right as a leveler and from the left as defending inequality (Chambers 2006, 83). Rawls (1993, 166) can be read as merely saying that people should have some minimum levels of income and education although his position is also interpreted as favoring radical egalitarian reforms in property ownership and control (Chambers 2006, 83). If Rawls is nothing but an advocate of a safety net, he has added little to liberalism, but if he is a radical leveler, he is being ignored by many liberals (Chambers 2006, 81).

Communitarianism

Liberals extending back to John Locke have affirmed that the individual is the only standard by which political theory and public policy should be judged (Reiman 1994, 20). Daniel Weinstock (2015, 305) declares: "if one thing unites liberals, it is a commitment to what may be termed political individualism." He defines this term as the belief that the justification of public policy must be grounded on the good of individuals (p. 305). This emphasis on the individual implies a sharp distinction between private and public. One of Locke's objectives was to protect the individual from governmental power. Building on the thought of several

predecessors, Locke accomplished that objective in part by making the individual, not groups or the community, the sole measure of worth of a system of government. As Weinstock (2015, 306) expresses it: "Groups matter only to the extent that they matter to individuals." These considerations imply that government is responsible to the people, not the other way around–thus the distinction between public and private. Intertwining public and private raises the importance of government to a level equal to the people–a return to the pre-Lockean doctrine of contract by which the king and the people were equals (Kautz 1995). Cementing and protecting Locke's sharp distinction between the rights of the people and the duties of a government subordinate to the people is the absolute right of people to own property.

Margaret Moore (1993, 168) asserts that central to liberalism is an individualist "dichotomy between self-interest and morality..." In our previous chapter we distinguished between self-interest and ideology (which includes morality) as *the* two ways of thinking about public policy. Moore rejects this distinction, describing a person: "not as abstracted from her community, from all ethical concerns or values, but as within a particular tradition, with particular interests, aims, and values. The person is conceived not as narrowly self-referential but as centrally committed to particular values or ways of life." (pp.167-168). We argue that the existence of self-interest does not require that the political actor is an abstract individual. We saw in the previous chapter that interest group theorists such as Arthur Bentley and David Truman regard self-interest as virtually the only political motivator. Interest groups are numbers of people with shared attitudes (the interests) making demands on other numbers of people with their own shared attitudes. Self-interest does not imply the presence of an abstract single rational actor.

Linda C. McClain (1992, 2) joins Moore in rejecting individualism as central to liberalism. For her, traditional liberalism sees people as atomistic with: "competing individuals establishing a legal system to pursue their own interests and to protect them from others' interference with their rights to do so." Her alternative

feminist view has people as interdependent, responsible for one another, and caring for each other (p. 2). McClain's imagery is reinforced by Stephen Holmes' (1993, 180) criticism that communitarians: "suggest that once people overcome their self-interest, they necessarily act in an admirable and public-spirited way." But, he objects: "This leaves out of the account the prominent place of selfless cruelty in human affairs. It is much easier to be cruel in the course of acting for the sake of others or for a 'cause,' than while acting for one's own sake." (p. 180) He cites the example of homosexuals executed in the name of Islam.

Holmes (1993, 191) points to a central communitarian objection to liberalism the fact that since people are social animals, liberalism's individualism is factually incorrect: "Presocial individuals do not exist. Therefore, Locke was simply dreaming." Holmes' response to this line of criticism is that the major liberal thinkers were not only aware of social life, they devoted a great deal of attention to it (pp. 191-192).

Feminist Sandra Farganis (1993) seeks to soften or abandon the classical liberal public-private distinction and place less emphasis on the individual and greater stress on community needs. Her allies in this approach include some feminist colleagues as well as others who come to this conclusion from several directions (Sandel 1984; Levin-Waldman 1996; Anderson 1990; Williams 1997; Tam 1998). The transition from a feminist critique of liberalism to a debate between communitarians and theorists who defend liberalism's individualist and public-private separation foundations (Johnston 1994) is typical of the complex divisions in the post- 1970 internal liberal debate.

Some so-called postmodern leftists move farther toward eliminating the idea of individualism arguing, as explained by Holmes (2016, 79-80), that individuals are: "fictitious social categories created by the ruling class to protect their selfish interests. People's identities are socially constructed things that solely reflect the interests of race, class, or gender. Since individuals are simply social constructs, it is perfectly acceptable to treat them as mere

instruments of power and society."

C. F. Delaney (1994, viii) believes that characterizing the liberal-communitarian division as a chasm exaggerates their differences: "Liberals clearly acknowledge that some common commitments and common values are necessary for a viable society, while communitarians provide space for genuine individuality within their conception of a cohesive social order." This is doubtless true of most liberals and some communitarians, but the key differences lie in what each side regards as its basic unit of analysis. We do not understand how someone can view politics and government first and foremost as based on the community and conclude with anything but a groupthink-ruled collective (Delaney 1994, ix).

Liberal Jeffrey Reiman (1994, 30) argues that true community, which he defines as being voluntary and characterized by a "free expression of shared commitment," can only thrive in a liberal society in which there are "boundaries between individuals where one person's freedom begins and another's ends..." He cautions that: "Unless community is truly and explicitly voluntary, it is a dangerous vehicle of oppression of individuals in the name of the group..." (p. 31)

Value pluralism

Another source of debate within the left concerns the freedom of diverse social, religious, and political groups and their associated belief systems and interests. This debate is often associated with the term value pluralism. Liberal Isaiah Berlin (1984 first published in 1969; 1997) is often credited with the original formulation of value pluralism (Hardy 2000). It is the view that social, religious, and political values are many and varied, and that we possess no basis for objectively and comprehensively weighing their relative merits (Berlin 1984, 31; Larmore 1987; Crowder 2002, 2; Galston 1999, 770).

Although the term value pluralism is relatively new, the concept is not. British parliamentarian Edmund Burke and the United States Founding Fathers regarded the diversity and incomparability of interests and values as critical elements of wise governance. For

Burke this concept (the term value pluralism appeared nearly two centuries after his death) meant that England in its dealings with colonies such as India should not attempt to crush local customs and transplant English institutions. England had no basis for concluding that local customs, which had developed over centuries, were inferior. The Founding Fathers approached the problem of diversity and incomparability of interests and values by creating a relatively weak and democratic central government with its institutional structures representing differing interests and guaranteeing freedom in the Bill of Rights. To some degree, government would serve as a neutral broker of diverse interests (Adams 2001, 39).

Few concepts were more fundamental than value pluralism to interest group theorists such as Arthur Bentley (1967) and David Truman (1951) even though their research agendas were behavioral not ethical or ideological (see also Galston 1999, 2002; McLennan 1995, 34-36). The image of governance that dominates interest group theory is that of a government acting as a neutral translator of interests into public policy.

Value pluralism is often explained by contrasting it with relativism. Relativism is the view that there is no objective reason to rank one value above another, that is, all value rankings are arbitrary and culture-based (Luper 2004, 271-272; Kekes 1997, 162). This means, for example, that it would be impossible objectively to choose between freedom (negative, positive, or both) and a totalitarian regime that suppresses freedom in any form. According to a relativist, our choice would be based on nothing but personal preference. We and probably most of our readers would favor freedom, but that choice would not be based on some timeless absolute standard. According to relativism, our position would simply be an expression of preference, and our choice is not that of the people of all nations and cultures.

Value pluralism seems indistinguishable from relativism and some authors come close to equating them (e.g., Gray 1998). However, most value pluralists appear to believe that there are objective standards by which to compare at least some values and

interests (e.g., Berlin 1984; Galston 1999, 770). The challenge that value pluralism offers liberalism concerns logical consistency more than policy. The liberal stance toward diverse values is based on equality and freedom. The liberal emphasis on equality requires that government must assume a neutral stance toward any religion, life style, or other values that do not harm others. However, the liberal defense of the marketplace of ideas and government value-neutrality is itself a value position (Moore 1993, 177-179). Value pluralists accuse liberals of inconsistency as they try both to present themselves as favoring neutrality but also defending a particular set of values (Galston 1999, 773; Gray 1996, 152; Heineman 1994, 177-178, 180-194). Crowder (2003) among others sees value pluralism as capable of making choices among some values that are of more than local or personal validity (Berlin 1969; Lukes 1994). One such value is open-mindedness–derivable from value pluralism's recognition of the existence of a variety of values and interests (Crowder 2003, 15-16).

As we noted above, Edmund Burke wrestled with many of these questions in the late 1700s. Burke's place as a value pluralist rests on his critique of theoretically derived natural rights. To Burke, natural rights conjured up from an abstract theory were meaningless except as a rallying cry for radicals fomenting revolution. For Burke if rights were part of a people's longstanding political traditions, they could be considered legitimate rights, but those rights were not to be regarded as universal.

It is unclear what public policy differences, if any, exist between value pluralism and liberalism especially at the level of federal public policy. We have seen that liberals (and conservatives) have long recognized the existence of and tolerate many incompatible social, religious, and political interests and values some of which are hostile to democracy and freedom. In Western democracies liberals and conservatives respond to the condition of pluralism by establishing and defending an open political system that protects the right of all groups to participate in the political process by nonviolent means–government as an arena with a referee.

Liberal debates

No one can foretell how these disputes–carried out for decades on many theoretical levels among academics, journalists, and politicians–will end except that they will not end soon or ever. Who is winning and losing, who is important and unimportant in terms of impact on public policy, and in what form liberalism will emerge is unknowable (Gaus 2001, 15-25).

Conservatism

One definition of conservatism equates it with preservation (White 1964, 1), but the complex bundle of ideas that makes up the work of self-described conservatives and classical liberals (who are today widely regarded as conservatives) goes far beyond this simplistic notion. The roots of conservative thought are found in a melancholy assessment of the basic nature of humanity and a pessimistic view of how much or how rapidly society can change without it being destroyed. In the conservative view, people are inherently sinful and fallible so that maintaining even modest degrees of societal order, freedom, and prosperity is very difficult.

This gloomy conservative view of human nature may be contrasted with a more hopeful liberal perspective that humans are born without the negative characteristics attributed to them by conservatives. The more optimistic liberal view has peoples' apparently wicked ways taught and not inherent in their humanity. This observation suggests the possibility that rapid societal reform can be achieved especially through education (Schapiro 1958, 12). We must not push this point too far by making liberals appear to be naive optimists and conservatives defeatists mired in despair, but these tendencies are observable.

The influence of Edmund Burke

Conservatives, following Edmund Burke, believe that successful societies and governments are the result of centuries of trial and error. Traditions and established practices represent lessons learned through experience. Conservatives counsel extreme caution in reforming stable political, economic, and social systems even when changes promise improvements and especially when the initiatives are based

on theory. They believe that social arrangements are far too complex to be fully understood by anyone least of all social scientists and philosophers. Seemingly modest reforms based on good intentions and apparently well considered theories can produce destructive unanticipated consequences (Burke 1960a, 17, 228; Adams 2001, 55-56; Skorupski 2015, 401).

Burke lived during the American and French Revolutions, a time when liberalism, ranging from moderate to radical, had become the dominant political ideology of Western civilization. To a substantial degree, his ideas fit within the liberal framework and are insupportable outside of it. Somewhat like liberals, Burke associated freedom with human rights: "The rights of men, that is to say, the natural rights of mankind, are indeed sacred things; and if any public measure is proved mischievously to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that measure..." (Burke 1990, 4.5.13) Burke deviated from liberals with a distinction between, on the one hand, genuine rights which were the products of specific national histories and, on the other hand, abstract rights which were typically generated by a theory, unrelated to reality, and often destructive to a society. During the violence of the French Revolution, he wrote: "I doubt much, very much, indeed, whether France is at all ripe for liberty on any standard. Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites; in proportion as their love to justice is above their rapacity. ...men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters." (Burke 1791)

In contrast to his observations about the French, Burke spoke approvingly of Americans being ready to shoulder the responsibilities of freedom (Burke 2005). For Burke, American rights like rights in any country were not abstract but situational.

To some (much debated) degree, Burke was a democrat, referring to the people as the "true legislator." (Burke 1960b, 229-230; Burke 2005). But he also wrote that the people: "are presumed to consent to whatever the legislator ordains for their benefit." (Burke 1970, 108) He believed in rule by a responsive, "high-minded meritocracy,

not an hereditary aristocracy." (p. 108) His meritocracy was connected to the people primarily through the House of Commons which "was designed as a control *for* the people." (p. 114) Burke's rough English equivalent of the American separation of powers was the monarchy, the aristocracy including the House of Lords, and the House of Commons.

Burke was a pluralist in that he believed in the existence, importance, and usefulness of interest groups. He described societal interests as: "various, multiform, and intricate." (Burke1960a, 479). It was the job of government to resolve conflict among these interests. Like Locke and virtually all liberals after him, Burke (p. 479) recognized that a person's rights were limited by others' rights. Variety implies inequality, and conservatives share with liberals a belief in the natural inequality of people.

From its beginnings to the present, conservatism has continued to operate within the framework of a dominant liberal ideology. Although conservative theorist and historian Russell Kirk (1953, 29) contrasts Burke and Locke as if they represented two ends on a spectrum, much of Burke would not have been possible without Locke. Throughout the 19th Century and the first half of the 20th Century conservatism existed in the United States only as fragments of interests and ideas reacting against liberalism.

It would be an oversimplification to say that conservatism was nothing but opposition to liberalism, but until the 1940s there were few conservative counterparts to such liberal theorists as Hobson and Keynes and no conservative counterparts to Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman (Gaus 2001, 14). Even the British conservative Winston Churchill was more important as a war leader than as a conservative thinker or policy-maker.

Conservatism, classical liberalism, and freedom

We noted earlier that in the late 1800s and early 1900s liberalism underwent a transformation that turned on the development of the concept of positive freedom and that classical liberals rejected this expansion in the definition of freedom (Narveson 1997, 19). The conservative's and classical liberal's central objection to the concept

of positive freedom is that it is not freedom. Classical liberal Frederich Hayek distinguished freedom ("state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others") from what he called liberty as power ("the physical ability to do what I want, the power to satisfy our wishes...") (1960,11, 16-17). For Hayek positive freedom translates into wealth which to some degree gives people the ability to do what they want, and while wealth is important, it is not freedom. Calling it freedom simply confuses thought.

To those on the right, whether conservative or classical liberal, freedom means negative freedom only. Liberals when using the word freedom may mean one or the other or both depending on context. Conservatives and liberals regard both political freedom and wealth as necessary, but liberals regard economic freedom as being somewhat less important than do conservatives (Roepke 1964, 78).

For conservatives political and economic freedom are nearly always reduced by expanded government (Roepke 1964, 81). Hayek approaches the topic of freedom by examining coercion. He defines coercion as control over an individual's circumstances that forces the individual to act, not according to his or her self-interest, but to fit another's objectives (Hayek 1960, 20-21). Hayek, along with most liberal theorists and political scientists, argues that government by definition possesses an authoritative monopoly over coercion (p. 21). He distinguishes coercion from other less oppressive ways to influence behavior. For example, we can block someone's direction on a sidewalk causing them to move to the left or right, but that is not coercive because there is no threat of harm aimed at bringing about specific conduct (p. 134).

Conservatives consider government the preeminent threat to freedom because, as we just noted, it possesses a legitimate monopoly on the use of coercion. Hayek dismisses Hobhouse's argument that corporate power is a significant threat to freedom. To Hayek the power of an employer is not comparable to government authority. Private sector personnel voluntarily seek employment, and they can terminate it and find a job elsewhere

(Hayek 1960, 135). There are exceptions such as "periods of acute unemployment" when the threat of termination may be used to coerce employees, but Hayek maintains that such circumstances are rare (pp. 136-37). Liberals disagree that coercion is confined to government in practice, and they often justify expanding government programs to reduce privately employed coercion.

Hayek (1960, 227) distinguishes between legitimate government programs that apply coercion to the enforcement of general rules such as motor vehicle traffic regulations versus measures that work by arbitrarily discriminating between individuals or groups. Discrimination violates the rule of law which must be applied equally to all. Discrimination diminishes freedom.

Some on the right object even to basic welfare programs, but Hayek favors government safety nets that aid "the indigent, unfortunate, and disabled" and provide narrowly defined security against severe physical privation (pp. 258-259). However, Hayek opposes welfare programs or tax structures such as a progressive income tax designed to redistribute income. A progressive tax is characterized by increasing tax rates as ability to pay increases. In other words, under a progressive tax relatively wealthy individuals are taxed at higher *rates* than the poor or middle class. Hayek regards a progressive tax as another form of unequal government treatment that reduces freedom (pp. 313-314). In addition, he argues that the theory of progressive taxation furnishes no standard that prescribes tax rate structures. Hayek maintains that the rule of law requires that laws must be known and applied equally to all. Income redistribution violates the second half of this standard (Hayek 1960, 205, 209; Narveson 1997, 26).

Kenneth Henley (1997, 192) characterizes conservative and classical liberal opposition to income redistribution as myopic in that it concentrates on only one particular threat to freedom and the rule of law. He argues that conservatives and classical liberals should balance the evils of redistribution as government encroachment on individual freedom (which, like virtually all liberals, he regards as trivial) and the benefits of redistribution to maintain equality and

ultimately order. In addition to the human suffering extreme poverty produces, he asserts, it can generate an antagonism to the law and everything associated with it. Few on the right accept this logic.

As Locke argued, a necessary but not sufficient way that freedom can be secured is by guaranteeing that people possess a private sphere where they are protected against coercion (Hayek 1960, 9). Again, this is accomplished by formulating general rules, that is, rights that apply equally to all. Hayek does not list all of the rights needed for freedom to exist, but he does include the right to privacy with no one having the authority to take notice of one's personal life (p. 142). Privacy means, among other things, that whether we regard the actions of others as good or bad, moral or immoral is not a legitimate reason for coercion to be applied (p. 145). Few liberals would disagree with Hayek's ideas in broad outline, but there would be many differences as Hayek applies them to specific policy areas especially with regard to the size of government. Those on the religious right would be more likely to object to Hayek's formulation than would liberals.

Conservatives and classical liberals never accepted the notion of positive freedom because it gives intellectual license to government to expand coercion into areas of life that the right regards as private. Liberals have resisted classical liberal and conservative attempts to undermine the concept of positive freedom. Some contemporary theorists essentially repeat the original Hobhouse and Green thesis that freedom is only valuable if it is a condition that allows people to live a fulfilling life, and that a lack of financial resources renders negative freedom valueless (Phillips 1997, 58-59).

Liberal James P. Sterba's (1997, 39) interpretation of the positive/negative freedom distinction rests on a claim that his idea of freedom is confined entirely to negative freedom which he defines as: " the absence of interference by other people from doing what one wants or is able to do." However, the phrase "doing what one wants or is able to do" is thinly disguised positive freedom. This becomes clear when he argues that defending the freedom of the poor requires that the poor be free to satisfy basic needs by taking surplus wealth

from the rich. For Sterba's approach to make sense we must assume that to some degree the wealthy do not deserve their surplus wealth (however surplus is defined) and that the poor do not deserve to be poor. He does not make clear how these judgments are to be made in practice.

Sterba demonstrates that the running liberal-conservative debate over positive and negative freedom should be understood in part as a debate over tradeoffs between freedom and equality. Conservatives tend to oppose government programs that reduce the freedom of the wealthy by redistributing wealth to the poor, especially the undeserving poor–those who choose not to work.

Alistair Macleod (1997), another liberal critic of the conservative definition of freedom, asserts that the word freedom implies multiple freedoms. For example, one person's freedom to make noise conflicts with another's freedom to sleep. Once we determine that even desirable freedoms must be limited in some circumstances, we are able to limit negative freedom in favor of assisting the poor (Macleod 1997, 88-97; Phillips 1997, 60).

Another response by a few liberals to conservatives who value negative freedom and dismiss positive freedom is to reduce the importance of freedom by denying the validity of the concept of the individual, another illustration of how ideological debates can circle around from one concept to another. Patricia H. Werhane (1997, 11), a communitarian, argues that freedom is a product of social interaction and is therefore inextricably connected to peoples' responsibilities to others (Adams 2001, 39-40). Werhane accurately characterizes Isaiah Berlin as assuming the existence of an autonomous self who has a right to be left alone. She argues that an autonomous self would be an empty shell because it would lack psychological resources to make decisions (Werhane 1997, 106). Werhane seems not to understand that once the liberal conceptions of the individual and individual freedom (that extends back to Locke) are swept away, individuals lack any defense against the predations of government. It is difficult to understand how communitarians can be considered liberals.

The 1930s-1950s

Conservative reactions to the New and Fair Deals came primarily from Republican members of Congress and journalists. These responses consisted largely of a reflexive rejection of all liberal proposals and appeared to be based primarily on self-interest, not ideology. Like liberals, conservatives had little idea what caused the Great Depression, so they were in no position effectively to critique New Deal proposals. The authors of the New and Fair Deals at least offered action, and through a process akin to natural selection, some of their many new programs were found to be useful and survived while others disappeared (Grafton 1983).

In general, liberal and conservative theorists devote more attention to domestic than foreign policy. Beyond a common hostility toward colonialism, friendliness to fellow democrats around the world, a dislike of dictatorships, and a general posture favoring national defense, neither ideology offers clear guidance regarding the conduct of foreign policy, and the foreign policy tenets of both have been highly fluid in the past half century.

In post World War II foreign and defense policy liberals displayed signs of naiveté that allowed conservatives their first opportunity to initiate effective public policy formulation since the days of Presidents Harding and Coolidge. Prior to World War II conservative foreign policy was isolationist. In particular, some conservatives opposed Franklin Roosevelt's early efforts to come to Europe's defense against Nazi Germany (Hamby 1992, 107- 108). After the war liberals hoped that the antifascist alliance including the USSR and the United States would remain in existence allowing members to concentrate on rebuilding their domestic economies. Liberals also hoped that the newly created United Nations would be the key mechanism by which international cooperation could be implemented. Conservatives were highly critical of the UN, fearing a loss of American sovereignty to a world government.

The Truman Administration did not adhere to the liberal hope for continued U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Truman expressed a moderate liberal view in his 1948 inaugural address characterizing communism

as deceitful, tyrannical, and warlike. Under Truman, American foreign policy would consist of four points: support of the United Nations; continued foreign aid efforts and reductions in trade barriers; creation of a North Atlantic defense treaty; and making science and technology available to underdeveloped countries.

Truman tolerated or even supported undemocratic right wing governments in Spain, Greece, Iran, and China against communists attempting to take control. Many but not all liberals believed that these communist movements were, to paraphrase the words of one congressman, spontaneous and democratic movements of agrarian, peasant, and submerged urban classes to rescue themselves from their hopeless economic conditions (Hamby 1992, 96). Conservatives offered a more realistic understanding of the futures awaiting those enveloped by communism.

Many liberals were equally naive regarding nuclear weapons. According to Alonzo L. Hamby (1992, 98), some liberals believed that the U.S. monopoly over nuclear weapons: "provoked the Soviet Union to a defensive aggressiveness. Virtually all liberals, whether or not they agreed entirely with this thesis, believed that the destructive new force of atomic energy must be controlled by some sort of international authority." Some liberals even wanted to share nuclear discoveries with the USSR as a way of building trust between the two nations.

In the fall of 1949 the USSR exploded its first atomic bomb. Conservatives and some moderate liberals understood the consequent need for increased military expenditures, although they differed regarding the appropriate mixture of forces. Liberals tended to stress the development of conventional capabilities that would permit non-nuclear responses while conservatives were inclined to emphasize accelerated development of nuclear weapons to completely deter the use of force. Some liberals believed that any expansion in U.S. defense capabilities would increase the probability of war (Hamby 1992, 373-374).

In 1948 a New York grand jury indicted Alger Hiss, a high level State Department official, for perjury regarding espionage charges

that had been leveled against him. There followed quickly the arrests of others for spying including some accused of providing the USSR with information that probably accelerated Soviet development of the atomic bomb. Most of those arrested had leftist ties and to varying degrees after their arrests received media support from many liberals. Even the normally realistic Truman discounted the charges against Hiss calling them a "red herring."

The communist absorption of Eastern Europe, what came to be known as the loss of China to communism, liberal naivete regarding communism and the aggressive tendencies of communist leaders, liberal disinclination to provide assistance to Greece and Iran in the face of communist expansion, liberal hesitancy to recognize the need for increased military spending, and the liberal inclination to defend or excuse spies who provided information to the USSR combined to form a picture of an ideology ill-equipped to survive in the post World War II environment. Isolationist conservatives found it no less difficult to deal with post War international affairs. For example, the leading conservative Republican in the Senate, Robert A. Taft (1951), was unable to formulate a coherent program that bridged his anticommunism, isolationism, and opposition to continuing or expanded U.S. military expenditures.

As foreign policy was being redirected by Truman despite the efforts of many liberals, conservatives proceeded to overplay the first good hand they had been dealt in several decades. Some conservative Republicans branded liberals and trade union leaders with no sympathy for communism as communists, communist-sympathizers, reds, or, when in a charitable mood, pinkos. Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican Party's 1948 presidential nominee, foolishly characterized the Communist Party, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and Democrats as allies (Hamby 1992, 382). And, conservative Republicans in Congress sponsored anti-communist sedition bills which seriously threatened First Amendment rights.

The Red Scare, as it came to be known, reached the level of hysteria with accusations by Wisconsin Republican Senator Joseph

R. McCarthy that the State Department was riddled with communists. Although he revealed little evidence and despite the fact that his list of State Department communists shriveled within two days from 205 to 81 and then 57, many Americans took the Senator's accusations seriously. Without opposition from Republican leaders, he grew stronger, and his paranoid mentality spread to schools, industry, and the media. Careers were ruined by the mere suspicion that an individual might have communist tendencies. Conservatives who encouraged or failed to discourage McCarthy during his 1951-1952 heyday enjoyed evanescent political victories, but the long-term cost was a loss of credibility.

Following the Truman presidency the election of Dwight Eisenhower brought a moderate conservative Republican to the White House. To a substantial degree, in domestic affairs the central dynamic of the Eisenhower years consisted of liberal Democrats in Congress pushing for expansion of the New and Fair Deals and conservative Republicans sometimes aided by southern Democrats opposing that expansion (Sundquist 1968, 389-410). Occasionally, liberals succeeded in enacting a compromise version of one of their proposals.

James L. Sundquist (1968, 417) and others described congressional Republicans of this era as divided between north-eastern moderates and conservatives. The moderates were more willing than the conservatives to favor new or expanded federal programs, but the moderates tended to advocate larger roles in those programs for states or the private sector than liberal Democrats would have. Sundquist saw Republican conservatives as representing mainly the rural Midwest. They or their predecessors had opposed virtually every element of the New and Fair Deals. In the Eisenhower years they wanted at minimum no further federal expansion and many favored a reduction in the size and power of the federal government and tax cuts (Sundquist 1968, 417).

The moderate Eisenhower made few serious attempts to cancel or significantly scale back Fair Deal or New Deal programs, but he blocked or forced compromises in many liberal congressional

initiatives by using vetoes or threats of vetoes (Sundquist 1968, 419-420). His administration frustrated both liberals and conservatives in its treatment of domestic legislation. In foreign policy Eisenhower satisfied the interests of internationalist conservatives (as opposed to fading numbers of isolationists) and internationalist liberals. He maintained the nation's defenses and contained expansion of the Soviet Union and Communist China with a series of alliances.

Through the 1950s conservative intellectuals and journalists including classical liberals were engaged in the construction of both ideological and institutional foundations for what would be a resurgent conservatism. Their work contributed to the presidential candidacy of Arizona Republican Senator Barry Goldwater in 1964. Although Goldwater lost to Lyndon Johnson by an overwhelming margin, his nomination and candidacy demonstrated the potential for conservative control of the Republican Party and the growing political importance of southern and western states. Congressional election victories by northeastern liberal Democrats supplanted moderate Republicans, and passage of the Voting Rights Act and other civil rights legislation slowly resulted in the replacement of conservative Democrats by Republicans. Both movements produced an increasingly ideologically divided Congress, a topic to which we will return in the last chapter.

Conservative debates

By omission (not pushing for an end to racial discrimination in the South) or commission (opposing civil rights legislation because of states rights), conservatives in the 1960s placed themselves on the wrong side of one of the 20th Century's most important moral struggles. The Eisenhower administration did not vigorously champion civil rights, but the president selected the moderate Republican Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Earl Warren who is identified with the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) decision that constituted the beginning of the end of state sponsored school segregation. Somewhat reluctantly, Eisenhower enforced the Supreme Court's ruling by using federal troops to integrate schools

in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Conservatives in the 1960s could have built on the Eisenhower Republican foundation to develop a civil rights program, but they failed to do so. Congressional liberals, on the other hand, supported in varying degrees by President John F. Kennedy and then led by President Lyndon Johnson, won enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Fundamentally, liberals and civil rights leaders presented a simple but powerful argument on behalf of both bills: African-Americans wanted to be accorded the same rights as those enjoyed by all other Americans.

President Johnson's ambitions extended beyond the area of civil rights. After Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, Harry Truman's Fair Deal, and John F. Kennedy's New Frontier, Johnson promoted his Great Society which centered on eliminating poverty and extending health insurance programs (Evans & Novak 1966, 426). The Great Society was an example of the liberal advocacy of positive freedom, and the opposition of conservatives to the Great Society illustrates their refusal to accept this notion as legitimate.

Conservative civil rights paralysis and opposition were at least partly responsible for what little electoral strength Barry Goldwater demonstrated in 1964, and in subsequent years they helped bring about an increase in Republican Party strength in the South and West. This impact was amplified by leaders of the civil rights movement, liberal intellectuals, politicians, and journalists pushing for affirmative action (characterized by conservatives as reverse discrimination) and what came to be known as forced school busing to achieve school integration. Passage of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs plus the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions banning state-sponsored prayer in public schools (*Engel v. Vitale* 1962) and legalizing abortion throughout the nation (*Roe v. Wade* 1973) also strengthened elements of the right. The school prayer and abortion decisions were greeted with dismay by social/ cultural conservatives (sometimes called the religious right or the Christian right) who viewed them as examples of a liberal judiciary illegitimately exercising legislative powers and federal government

interference in the rights of states to manage their own affairs. However, as we will see, conservatives were not united in opposition to these decisions. Liberals were and are almost unanimous in defending both.

Since roughly 1970 conservatives have been engaged in intra ideological debates which appear at first glance similar to ideological struggles on the left; however, the conservative discord has been considerably simpler. The major schisms on the right are sometimes summarized in terms of a three way split among Chamber of Commerce conservatives (classical liberal business people who willingly use government to promote their economic self-interest), social/cultural conservatives (who emphasize Burke's reverence for tradition and family), and classical liberals (including libertarians such as Rep. Ron Paul and Senator Rand Paul) who advocate uncompromising laissez faire. To the degree that the Tea Party movement is more than opposition to tax increases, it is dominated intellectually by classical liberals.

A major division exists within the right and between the right and the left concerning attitudes toward order. Conservatives going back to Burke have placed a special emphasis on traditional order (Cary 1998, xi). When Robert Bork, a conservative, wrote about the evils of widespread lewdness and vulgarity and when conservative Robert Bennett decried increases in violent crime, illegitimate births, and other signs of cultural decline they were defending traditional order (Cary 1998, xiv).

Most classical liberals (and liberals) share with conservatives dismay over societal deterioration but both kinds of liberals are less concerned with traditional order and more interested in freedom. Thus, conservatives often advocate such policies as censorship and laws against gay marriage which are opposed by both kinds of liberals.

Burkean conservatives frequently defend their advocacy of order as a defense of freedom. Freedom cannot exist until order is assured (Kirk 1998, 182). Robert Nisbet (1998, 46) and Russell Kirk (1998, 183) argue that conservatives see society as composed more of groups

than individuals. Burkean conservatives regard the absolute individualism of classical liberals as damaging to order and freedom: "it is the pulverizing of society into an ash heap of individual particles, each claiming natural rights, that makes the arrival of collectivist nationalism inevitable." (Nisbet 1998, 46) Part of the conservative prescription for preserving and enhancing order and freedom is the maintenance and nurturing of multiple authorities down to the level of church, school, and family. To the degree that these far flung entities maintain order, a central government is not required. Classical liberals rank freedom as the highest value almost regardless of disorder (Kirk, 1998, 182).

In the 1950s William F. Buckley, Jr. brought together all manner of conservatives and classical liberals in his new magazine *National Review*. Frank S. Meyer, a member of the *National Review* ensemble, made it his particular objective to merge Burkean conservatism and classical liberalism into what he called fusionism. Although this project achieved some success, many in both camps had no difficulty restraining their enthusiasm. For example, classical liberal economist Murray Rothbard (1998, 135) contrasted conservatives and classical liberals by writing that conservatives favored "state-coerced morality" while classical liberals favored freedom but were "soft on virtue." Social conservatives who enthusiastically inflicted their notions of virtue on everyone were statists according to Rothbard (p. 139). Rothbard denies that classical liberals regard freedom as the only political goal worth pursuing, but for classical liberals freedom is certainly important in and of itself and necessary for the achievement of other worthwhile values (p. 141).

Rothbard (1998) observes that it is a strategic weakness (albeit one that he accepts) that classical liberalism offers no comprehensive ethical philosophy as do conservatism and Marxism. Classical liberalism confines itself to the evils of state sanctioned violence (Rothbard 1998, 141). To some degree echoing value pluralists, he asserts that classical liberalism: "does not attempt to offer any theory except a political one; it is not competent to

provide a general theory of ethics." (p. 143)

The concept of community is a source of conflict within the right and the left. Classical liberals like Rothbard regard community as the central object of political concern as a dangerous notion. They argue that valuing community as superior to the individual can justify oppression and authoritarian rule. For classical liberals communities are nothing more than voluntary groups joined for convenience. Rothbard characterized conservatism as conceptually chaotic, a condition he traced to its modern origins as a reaction against the New Deal. He saw conservatism as defined more by what it was against than what it favored (Rothbard 1998, 136). As with liberals, it is not possible to determine who is winning the intra conservative debate or what form conservatism will take in coming years (Eccleshall 2001, 68).

Determining the Characteristics of Contemporary Liberalism and Conservatism

Some liberals and conservatives devote more attention to internecine struggles than debates with each other. Authors presenting accounts of these conflicts are often participants, making them unreliable guides to the changing ideological landscapes. On the left and right intellectual currents and political trends begin and end abruptly, twist, fade, shift, then reappear. Allies become opponents, and opponents become allies. Which currents and trends are important or have ended, and which authors and politicians have accomplished what is difficult, if not impossible, to discern from the vast and growing literatures produced by theorists and historians.

Two typical examples make the point. In *The Conservative Tradition in America* Charles W. Dunn and J. David Woodard (1996, 16-17) present a table comparing what they regard as the dominant tendencies of liberalism and conservatism. The table is divided into three categories: government; economy; and cultural and religious values. Under government Dunn and Woodard list the individual as the primary focus for liberals and for conservatives it is the community. We have already seen that many liberals whose work was

published well before the Dunn and Woodard copyright date are trying to shift the primary focus of government away from the individual toward the community. And, while some Burkean, cultural, or religious right conservatives have community as their primary focus, classical liberals and their some-time allies, Chamber of Commerce conservatives, believe the individual to be paramount.

Dunn and Woodard find that under the government category in the field of international relations liberal "direction of sentiment" is internationalist while for conservatives it is nationalist. Although many liberals are internationalists, it is equally true that many, especially in the field of international trade, are as nationalist as columnist and presidential aspirant Patrick J. Buchanan (1998), a self-described conservative. Opposition to moderate liberal Bill Clinton's free trade policies and Barak Obama's Trans-Pacific Partnership comes from the left and right. Similarly, usually conservative President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq was in its early stages supported by some liberals and conservatives and opposed by other liberals and conservatives.

According to Dunn and Woodard (1996, 31), liberal government is accountable to "man" while for conservatives government is accountable to "God." They fail to make clear how conservatives avoid the operational difficulties of making government accountable to God. Some on the religious right think of themselves as doing God's work by opposing abortion, pornography, and homosexual marriage, but one sees few references to God's position on how health care for the poor should be provided or whether there should be a tax on corporate profits. It is not enough simply to assert that conservatives believe that government should be accountable to God. The student of ideology should be able to work out the public policy implications of this belief. Liberal government being accountable to man is no clearer a standard than conservative government being accountable to God. For example, as we saw earlier in this chapter, John Rawls' widely discussed difference principle is impossible to operationalize with any assurance that

widespread agreement even among liberals could be reached. Complicating Dunn and Woodard's framework still more, some liberals employ Christian value arguments to justify government poverty programs.

We could extend this dissection of the Dunn and Woodard list, but there seems little reason to continue. Their interpretation of what constitutes contemporary conservatism and liberalism conflicts significantly with actual political behavior on both sides and the publications of many liberal and conservative theorists. It is not our purpose to criticize these two authors. We have yet to see a treatment of contemporary liberalism or conservatism that attempts to be comprehensive that could not be dismembered in a similar manner. A second example–this one focusing on liberalism–should drive this point home.

We saw earlier that schisms within liberalism are visible in the work of theorists, but divisions can also be seen in attempts at broad treatments such as that of Oren M. Levin-Waldman. After noting that contemporary liberalism is underappreciated by the public, he writes:

> Much of liberalism's problems may stem from the fact that there really isn't much of a consensus on what its core principles are. Liberalism has encompassed a broad spectrum of thought and opinion, and over the years it has consisted of several different strands emphasizing different principles (Levin-Waldman 1996, x).

That much is correct, but in his next sentence Levin-Waldman (pp. x-xi) misleads by identifying liberalism (and presumably excluding conservatives) as favoring: "individual liberty unconstrained by arbitrary exercises of power and authority (state or other)..." He adds: "Liberalism is a political philosophy espousing the right of individuals to choose for themselves their own conceptions of good and to live their lives accordingly." Similarly, Alan Ryan (2012, 28-29) identifies liberalism from its earliest years to the present with what he calls antiabsolutism by which he means: "avoiding absolute and arbitrary power."

While liberals oppose arbitrary exercises of power in theory, this characteristic does not separate them from conservatives or anyone else on the visible political spectrum (we exclude communists, royalists, fascists, and Muslim extremists). Furthermore, most conservatives would add, many liberal programs in practice quickly and predictably devolve into political arbitrariness, a point that political scientist Theodore Lowi (1969) also makes. Finally, many conservatives would argue that liberals no longer consistently champion the "right of individuals to choose for themselves their own conceptions of good"; instead, they favor a more communitarian perspective (Levin-Waldman 1996, xi). Indeed, Levin-Waldman himself quickly abandons the individual as the sole focus of public policy in favor of the community.

We believe that Levin-Waldman takes the communitarian side of the current debate among liberals over individualism and communitarianism, but it is by no means certain that he or other readers would agree with our characterization. That is the problem. Similarly, shifting back to the right, Jerry Z. Muller (1997, 429), the editor of an anthology of conservative writing, notes that conservative icon Russell Kirk offers: "a conception of conservatism quite different from the one highlighted in this book." Does Kirk or Muller offer the more authentic version of conservatism? Few conservatives would experience difficulty making this choice, but that selection would be a matter of opinion.

The Missing Policy Link

A problem with both theoretical and historical studies of liberalism and conservatism, in addition to bias and inconsistency, is that they shed little light on the relationship between ideology and public policy. Theorists and historians tend quite legitimately to concentrate on subtle nuances of ideology. In the period of post-Vietnam ideological conflict within liberal and conservative camps, a single element of a debate can span the full length of a book. It is surprising how many pages and even chapters of the works of contemporary theorists and historians one can read without seeing a single reference to a public policy issue except as an occasional

example to make a theoretical point. This characteristic contrasts sharply with theorists such as Edmund Burke and the U.S. Founding Fathers who were political leaders more than they were theorists; they explicitly connected theory and practice.

In the long run, ideological theorists are important. The impact of John Locke's ideas on governmental institutions and public policy into the foreseeable future is almost impossible to exaggerate. Even in the relatively short term it is sometimes possible to find a close link between a theorist and public policy. We have already noted the immediate effect that John Maynard Keynes had on U.S. economic policy and the nature of liberalism. Another example is the important role played by classical liberal economist Wilhelm Roepke, in Germany's extraordinary post World War II economic recovery. And, it seems clear that William F. Buckley, Jr. (another policy-oriented theorist) and the conservative thinkers whose work he published in *National Review* generated political change from at least the time of Barry Goldwater to Ronald Reagan's presidency and through the conservative Republican congressional victory in 1994 engineered by Newt Gingrich. More recently, *National Review* played a prominent role in opposing Donald Trump's effort to secure the Republican presidential nomination.

Despite their long term importance, focusing only on ideological theorists or even mainly on ideological theorists, will not allow us to discover the content of and changes in liberalism or conservatism with sufficient clarity to relate them to changing public policy. We must locate vehicles for ideology that present more unified, summative visions and which lie closer to public policy. Our interest is less in philosophical subtleties than it is on the relationship between ideology and public policy. We turn to these matters in the next chapter.

References

Aaron, H. J. 1978. *Politics and the professors: The Great Society in perspective*. Washington, DC: Brookings.

Ackerly, B. 2006. John Rawls: An introduction. *Perspectives on Politics*. 4: 75-80.

Adams, I. 2001. *Political ideology today*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Anderson, C. W. 1990. *Pragmatic liberalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bay, C. 1970. *The structure of freedom*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bentham, J. 1776. *A Fragment on Government*. www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/bentham/government.htm.

Bentham, J. 1781. *Introduction to principles of morals and legislation*. www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy- bentham/ index.html.

Bentley, A. 1967. *The process of government*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap. First published in 1908.

Berlin, I. 1969. *Four essays on liberty*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Berlin, I. 1984. Two concepts of liberty. In M. Sandel (Ed.), *Liberalism and its Critics* (15-36). New York: New York University Press.

Berlin, I. 1997. *The proper study of mankind*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.

Bolino, A. C. 1966. *The development of the American economy*. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill.

Brinkley, A. 1989. The New Deal and the idea of the state. In S. Fraser & G. Gerstle (Eds.), *The rise and fall of the New Deal order, 1930-1980* (85-121). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Buchanan, P. J. 1998. *The great betrayal*. New York: Little, Brown.

Burke, E. 1791. A letter to a member of the National Assembly. www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/burkee/ tonatass/index. htm.

Burke, E. 1960a. Letters on a regicide peace. In W. J. Bate (Ed.), Edmund *Burke selected works* (476-482). New York: The Modern Library. Originally published in 1795-1796.

Burke, E. 1960b. Tract on the popery laws. In W. J. Bate (Ed.),

Edmund Burke selected works (227-237). New York: The Modern Library. Originally published in 1765.

Burke, E. 1970. *Works and correspondence*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Burke, E. 1982. Change and conservation (from *Reflections on the revolution in France*). In R. Kirk (Ed.), *The portable conservative reader* (9-13). New York: Penguin.

Burke, E. 1990. Speech on Fox's East India bill. In E. J. Payne (Ed.), *Select Works of Edmund Burke*, Vol 4, (4.5.4-4.5.111). Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. Speech delivered 1783. www.econlib.org/library/

Payne, E. J. (Ed.), *Select works of Edmund Burke*, Vol. 1. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. Originally published in 1770. Burke, E. 2005. Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol on the affairs of America. In *The works of the right honourable Edmund Burke*, Vol. II. Project Gutenberg Ebook. www.gutenberg.org/ ebooks// 15198/15198-h/15198-h.htm. Originally published in 1777.

Cary, G., (Ed.). 1998. *Freedom and virtue: The conservative/ libertarian debate*. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.

Chambers, S. 2006. The politics of equality: Rawls on the barricades. *Perspectives on Politics*. 4: 81-89.

Crowder, G. 2002. Two value-pluralist arguments for liberalism. *Australian Journal of Political Science*. 37: 457-473.

Crowder, G. 2003. Pluralism, relativism and liberalism in Isaiah Berlin. *Australasian Political Studies Association Conference*. Refereed paper presented at Australasian Political Studies Association Conference. 74.125.155.132/ scholar?q=cache: |KiGNd38rUJ:Scholar.google. com

Dunn, C. W. & J. D. Woodard. 1996. *The conservative tradition in America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Delaney, C. F. (Ed.) 1994. *The liberalism-communitarianism debate*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Dworkin, R. 1978. *Taking rights seriously*. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Eccleshall, R., V. Geoghegan, R. Jay, and R. Wilford. 1984. *Political ideologies: An introduction*. London: Hutchinson.

Eccleshall, R. 2001. The doing of conservatism. In M. Freeden (Ed.), *Reassessing political ideologies: The durability of dissent* (67-79). London, UK: Routledge.

Engerman, S. L. & K. L. Sokoloff. 1996. Technology and industrialization, 1790-1914. In S. L. Engerman & R. E. Gallman (Eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*. Volume II: *The long nineteenth century* (367-402). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Evans, R. and Novak, R. 1966. *Lyndon Johnson: The exercise of power*. New York: New American Library.

Farganis, S. 1993. Feminism and postmodernism. In A. Fontana & Dickins (Eds.), *Postmodernism and social inquiry* (101-126). New York: Guilford Press.

Fawcett, Edmund. 2014. *Liberalism: The life of an idea*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ferguson, T. 1989. Industrial conflict and the coming of the New Deal: The triumph of multinational liberalism in America. In S. Francis & G. Gerstle (Eds), *The rise and fall of the New Deal order 1930-1980* (3-31). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Freeden, M. 1978. *The new liberalism: An ideology of social reform*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Freeden, M. 2001. *Reassessing political ideologies: The durability of dissent*. London, UK: Routledge.

Friedan, B. 1963. *The feminine mystique*. New York: Norton.

Gallman, R. E. 1996. Economic growth and structural change in the long nineteenth century. In S. L. Engerman & R. E. Gallman (Eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*. Volume II *The long nineteenth century* (1-56). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Galston, W. A. 1999. Value pluralism and liberal political theory.

American Political Science Review. 93: 769-778.

Gaus, G. F. 2001. Ideological dominance through philosophical confusion: Liberalism in the twentieth century. In M. Freeden (Eds.), *Reassessing political ideologies: The durability of dissent* (13-34). London, UK: Routledge.

Glaab, C. N. 1976. *A history of urban America*. New York: Macmillan.

Grafton, C. 1975. The creation of federal agencies. *Administration and Society*. 7: 328-365.

Grafton, C. 1983. Response to change: The creation and reorganization of federal agencies. In R. Miewald & M. Steinman (Eds.), *Political reform* (25-42). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Gray, J. 1998. Where pluralists and liberals part company. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*. 6: 17-36.

Gray, J. 1996. *Isaiah Berlin*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Green, T. H. 1986. *Lectures on the principles of political obligation and other writings*. In P. Harris & J. Morrow (Eds). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Hamby, A. 1973. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hamby, A. 1992. *Liberalism and its challengers: From FDR to Bush*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hardy, H. 2000. Isaiah Berlin's key idea. *Philosopher's Magazine.* 11: 15-16. Accessed on the Internet 5/12/06.

Hayek, F. A.1960. *The constitution of liberty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Heineman, R. A. 1994. *Authority and the liberal tradition: From Hobbes to Rorty*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Henley, K. 1997. Poverty, equality, and taxation under the rule of law: A tension within classical liberalism. In L. May, C. Sistare, & J. Schonsheck (Eds.), *Liberty, equality, and plurality* (191-202). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas..

Higgs, R. 1987. *Crisis and leviathan*. New York/Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Hobbes, T. 1909. *Hobbes' leviathan*. London, UK: Oxford University Press/Clarendon.

Hobhouse, L. T. 1911. *Liberalism*. London: Oxford University Press.

Hobhouse, L. T. 1922. *The elements of social justice*. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing.

Hobson, J. A. 1974. *The crisis of liberalism*. New York: Harper & Row. Originally published in 1909. London, UK: P. S. King & Sons.

Holmes, Kim R. 2016. *The closing of the liberal mind*. New York: Encounter.

Holmes, Stephen. 1993. *The anatomy of antiliberalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hoover, K. 1987. *Ideology and political life.* Monterrey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Johnston, D. 1994. *The idea of a liberal theory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kautz, S. 1995. *Liberalism and community*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Katznelson, I. 1989. Was the Great Society a lost opportunity? In S. Francis & G. Gerstle (Eds.), *The rise and fall of the New Deal order 1930-1980* (185-211). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kekes, J. 1997. *Against liberalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Keynes, J. M. 1936. *General theory of employment, interest and money*. Original publication: New York: St. Martin's Press. http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//texts/keynes/gtntoe.htm.

Kirk, R. 1953. *The conservative mind*. Chicago, IL: Gateway.

Kirk, R. 1998. A dispassionate assessment of libertarians. In G. Cary (Eds.), *Freedom and virtue: The conservative/libertarian debate* (172-186). Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.

Kolko, G. 1963. *The triumph of conservatism*. New York: The Free

Press of Glencoe.

Larmore, Charles. 1987. *Patterns of moral complexity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lawson, R. A. 1971. T*he failure of independent liberalism (1930-1941)*. New York: Capricorn.

Levin-Waldman, O. M. 1996. *Reconceiving liberalism: Dilemmas of contemporary liberal public policy*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Locke, J. 1960. *The second treatise of government* In *Locke's two treatises of government*. P. Laslett, (Ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in 1689.

Louchheim, K., (Ed.). 1983. *The making of the New Deal: The insiders speak*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lowi, T. 1969. *The end of liberalism*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Lukes, S. 1994. The singular and the plural: On the distinctive liberalism of Isaiah Berlin. *Social Research* 61: 687-717.

Luper, S. 2004. Epistemic relativism. *Philosophical Issues*. 14: 271-295.

MacKinnon, C. 1993. *Only words*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

MacKinnon, C. 1995. A conversation with Catherine MacKinnon. Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg (PBS interview). www.pbs.org/thinktank/transcript215.html. Downloaded 4/8/12.

Macleod, A. M. 1997. Freedom versus equality: A false antithesis. In L. May, C. Sistare, & J. Schonsheck (Eds.), *Liberty, equality, and plurality* (86-104). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Manent, P. 1994. *Intellectual history of liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Maitra, I. 2009. Silencing speech. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*. 39: 309-338.

Manning. D. J. 1976. *Liberalism*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

May, L., C. Sistare, & J. Schonsheck (Eds.), *Liberty, equality, and plurality*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Meadowcroft, J./Hobhouse, L. T. 1994. *L. T. Hobhouse: Liberalism*

and other writings. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

McClain, L. C. 1992. "Atomistic man" revisited: Liberalism, connection, and feminist jurisprudence. *Southern California Law Review*. 65: 1-70.

McLennan, G. 1995. *Pluralism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Moore, M. 1993. *Foundations of liberalism*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Muller, J., (Ed.). 1997. *Conservatism: An anthology of social and political thought from David Hume to the present.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Narveson, J. 1997. Liberty, equality, and distributive justice. In L. May, C. Sistare, & J. Schonsheck (Eds.), *Liberty, equality, and plurality* (15-37). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Nisbet, R. 1998. Uneasy cousins. In G. Cary (Ed.), *Freedom and virtue: The conservative/libertarian debate* (38-54). Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute. .

Nozick, R. 1974. *Anarchy, state and utopia*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Parsons, T. 1959. An approach to the sociology of knowledge. *Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology*. Louvain, Belgium: International Sociological Association.

Phillips, D. 1997. The foundations of ethics and the conflict between liberty and equality. In L. May, C. Sistare, & J. Schonsheck (Eds.), *Liberty, equality, and plurality* (58-69). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Preston, L. M. 1984. Freedom, markets, and voluntary exchange. *American Political Science Review*. 78: 959-970.

Rawls, J. 1971. *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Rawls, J. 1993. *Political liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Reiman, J. 1994. Liberalism and its critics in Delaney, C. F. (Ed.)

1994. *The liberalism-communitarianism debate*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 19-37.

Ritchie, D. G. 1902. *The principles of state interference: Four essays on the political philosophy of Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mill, and T. H. Green*. London, UK: George Allen and Unwin.

Roepke,W. 1964. Education in economic liberty. In F. S. Meyer (Ed.), *What is conservatism* (78-87). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Rothbard, M. N. 1998. Frank S. Meyer: The fusionist as libertarian manque. In G. Cary (Ed.), *Freedom and virtue: The conservative/libertarian debate* (135-162). Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.

Ryan, Alan. 2012. *The making of modern liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sandel, M. 1984. Introduction. In M. Sandel (Ed.), *Liberalism and its critics* (1-10). New York: New York University Press.

Schapiro, J. S. 1958. *Liberalism: Its meaning and history*. Princeton: Anvil–D. Van Nostrand.

Skorupski, J. 2015. The conservative critique of liberalism. In Wall, S. (Ed.) *The Cambridge companion to liberalism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 401-422.

Smith, A. 1776. *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.* www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html.

Stears, M. 2001. Beyond the logic of liberalism: Learning from illiberalism in Britain and the United States. *Journal of Political Ideologies.* 6: 215-230.

Sterba, J. P. 1997. Reconciling liberty and equality, or why libertarians must be socialists. In L. May, C. Sistare, & J. Schonsheck (Eds.), *Liberty, equality, and plurality* (38-57). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Sundquist, J. L. 1968. *Politics and policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Taft, R. A. 1951. *A foreign policy for Americans*. Garden City, NJ:

Doubleday.

Tam, H. 1998. *Communitarianism*. Washington Square, NY: New York University Press.

Tocqueville, A. 1945. *Democracy in America*, Volume II. New York: Vintage.

Truman, D. 1951. *The governmental process*. New York: Knopf.

Tugwell, R. 1977. *Roosevelt's revolution*. New York: Macmillan.

Van Dyke, V. 1995. *Ideology and political choice*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

Wall, S. (ed.). 2015. *The Cambridge companion to liberalism*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstock, D. 2015. Liberalism and multiculturalism. In Wall, S. (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to liberalism.* (305-328), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Werhane, P. H. 1997. The compatibility of freedom, equality, and a communitarian notion of the self. In L. May, C. Sistare, & J. Schonsheck (Eds.), *Liberty, equality, and plurality* (105-115). Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

White, R. J. 1964. *The conservative tradition*. London, UK: Adam and Charles Black.

Williams, L. 1997. *American liberalism and ideological change*. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

Wolff, J. 2010. Fairness, respect and the egalitarian *ethos* revisited. *J Ethics*. 14: 335-350.

Young, J. P. 1996. *Reconsidering American liberalism*. Boulder, CO: Westview.