

A graphic element on the left side of the title block depicts the Cuban national flag, showing its red field with a white star and a blue rectangle containing three white stars.

# **SECURING THE FUTURE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CUBA'S SECURITY SERVICES**

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# Cuba Transition Project – CTP

The Cuba Transition Project (CTP) at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami is an important and timely project to study and make recommendations for the reconstruction of Cuba once the post-Castro transition begins in earnest. This is being accomplished through individual original research, work-study groups, and seminars. The project, which began in January 2002, is funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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5. **“Treaties and Accords”** - A collection of existing international treaties and accords entered into by the Castro government.
6. **“Political Prisoners”** - A listing of current Cuban political prisoners, including accusations, sentences, and pictures (when available).

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# Premises and Introduction

## ***Premises***

At some point in the near future, Cuba inevitably will undergo a political transformation. This paper assumes that the resulting regime will be a liberal democracy, likely a republic. Cuba's security needs subsequently must be reassessed. In turn, Cuba's security and intelligence community must be transformed to meet the emerging national security needs of a democratic Cuba.

## ***Purpose***

The purpose of this paper is to examine how appropriate changes in Cuba's security services can be made in a post-Castro transition. It outlines the evolution and composition of current security services in Cuba, suggests a model for those services during and after the transition, and proposes the steps necessary to achieve such changes.

## ***Current Strategic Perceptions***

The collapse of the Soviet Union has complicated Cuba's security challenges and has reconfigured how President Fidel Castro's regime approaches national security. Flowing from the current view that a viable economy is a critical bulwark against internal dissent, this shift in approach is reflected in the emergence of a reordered set of strategic objectives. Those objectives, in descending order of importance, are as follows:

- To reinsert Cuba into the international economy, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to reduce the internal political impact of that reinsertion.
- To safeguard gains made by the revolution to date (i.e., existing Cuban political and social structures).
- To repel possible U.S. intervention/invasion.

While the regime's objectives have been reconfigured, some aspects

of Cuban security have remained constant:

- All Cuban security services rely heavily on military support.
- Cuban citizens are expected to be the eyes and ears of Cuban security.
- Cuban security services are highly politicized and are agents of state control.

In a post-Castro situation, therefore, a radical review of all Cuban security and intelligence services will be necessary in order to create effective and accountable services for the Cuban population. This paper takes a first step in that direction.

## ***Methodology and Team***

Following is a brief description of the methodology upon which this study is based, the underlying assumptions and structures used to design a new model for security services in an emerging Cuban democracy, and the contributions of the respective team members to the design of this model.

### ***Methodology***

The first stage of this study was a careful assessment, based on open-source materials, of the history and evolution of Cuba's security services. Armed with an understanding of current security issues in Cuba, the project team was ready to design a new model for security services in a post-Castro environment.

The next stage of the study was the actual design of a model suitable to post-Castro security requirements, including the capacity to cope with such issues as internal threats, international crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and human migration. The design of the model was based on experiences and models of Canada, Nicaragua, Mexico, and South Africa.

### ***Models***

Canada was a primary model because of its tradition of democratic

accountability and effectiveness. Besides representing an aggregate of international best practices, Canada provides a basis for other services around the world.

The Nicaraguan model for security services was useful because security-related conditions in a post-Castro Cuba will likely resemble those of post-civil war Nicaragua in two ways. First, Nicaragua's security service had to be constructed from the ground up after the end of the civil war. Second, its model emerged in a society still torn by sharp divisions and cleavages in the aftermath of that civil war.

The South African model was important for a number of reasons. First, that nation's security service evolved out of and was based upon a new law, the Intelligence Services Act, which provided a legislative basis. In addition, it was developed from the ground up and had a well-defined transitional period that dealt with many of the same transitional issues as may be encountered in post-Castro Cuba.

The Mexican experience was examined because of ongoing reforms in the Office of the Attorney General and the heavy emphasis on drug interdiction. All these elements eventually may figure prominently in the Cuban security mosaic.

### *Project Team*

The Justice Solutions project team included senior associates in the fields of project design and research, security and intelligence, and training and development.

Eugene Rothman, Ph.D., president of Justice Solutions, who is responsible for the design of the organization's projects in the field of peacekeeping, security, policing, and intelligence in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, served as project leader for this study.

Bernard Barbe, formerly with the Canadian Intelligence and Security Service and the Office of the Solicitor General of Canada, and now a Justice Solutions senior associate in the field of security and intelligence, helped design this project's overall approach to policies and procedures.

Col. Gordon Graham (CF ret.), recently retired as director of plans and policies in the Canadian Forces' Intelligence Branch (J2) and now a Justice Solutions senior consultant, helped construct the organizational framework for the proposed security service model within the broader context of intergovernmental relationships.

Marvin Schiff, vice president of training, who is responsible for the design of all Justice Solutions training programs, designed the detailed training framework for senior members of the proposed Cuban Security Service.

Christopher Walker, a senior writer/researcher with Justice Solutions, who has worked on company projects dealing with the Middle East peace process and Africa-based efforts served as senior researcher and writer on this project.

## **Evolution of Existing Cuban Security Services**

Any transition process in Cuba will, to a large degree, result in the wholesale reconstruction of Cuba's security structure. To design an effective model for a new security structure requires examination of both the historical evolution and the current state of Cuba's security and intelligence community.

### ***The First 30 Years: 1959-1989***

Immediately after the 1959 revolution, the Cuban armed forces were purged of officers and supporters of the former regime of Cuba's president and dictator, Fulgencio Batista. Many members of Fidel Castro's Revolutionary Army were placed in key positions within the new Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR). By August 1959, the remnants of Batista's army had been disbanded completely. By the end of that year, between 200,000 and 300,000 new troops were in training under Raul Castro, Fidel's younger brother, who has headed MINFAR since the revolution.

Rafael Fermoselle, author of numerous books on the Cuban military, has noted that early in Castro's reign, "a very effective intelligence network was also being built throughout Cuba. It consisted mainly of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's)"<sup>1</sup> These committees were neighborhood organizations that reported any unusual activity to the government.

On June 6, 1961, Fidel Castro created the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) as the principal state security institution; it was under the

direct control of MINFAR and Raul Castro until 1971.

As Cuba's ties to the Soviet Union grew, Fidel Castro increasingly saw Cuba's armed forces as an arm of a global revolution. He therefore accepted Soviet help in reorganizing the Cuban military. The goal, according to Cuban-American scholar Jorge Dominguez, was to move from a semiprofessional force to a “smaller, capital-intensive, highly professional military with modern inventories.”<sup>2</sup>

As noted above, the Ministry of the Interior originally was under the command of MINFAR. During the reorganization of the early 1970s, it was placed under the command of the Council of Ministers, with MINFAR assuming control only in times of declared war. MININT subsequently assumed a greater international intelligence role. As Fermoselle observed, “By the mid-1970s, MININT had developed a worldwide network of spies directed against the United States and its allies.”<sup>3</sup>

In 1980, Castro created the Territorial Militia Troops after the model of the original Revolutionary Army to provide local intelligence, even at the neighborhood level.

The capabilities and effectiveness of Cuba's security sector improved substantially in the 1970s and 1980s with the influx of weapons from the USSR, including MiG jet fighters and advanced antiaircraft systems. During this time, an intense rivalry grew between MINFAR and MININT, “with the latter increasingly seen [by the former] as a repository for corruption and an undeserving beneficiary of the regime's largesse.”<sup>4</sup>

## ***Post-Soviet Challenges: 1989-2001***

### ***The Ochoa Affair***

In 1989, Army General Arnaldo Ochoa, a soldier in the revolution and a friend of the Castros, was accused, tried, and executed for drug trafficking, treason, and corruption. The head of MININT, Jose Abrantes, was convicted and jailed for failing to prevent Ochoa's corruption and treachery. Political coalitions formed along political lines in MININT and MINFAR, which exposed both their rivalry and their respective internal weaknesses. Over the next two years, the leadership of MININT was purged, and the ministry again was placed under the direct command of the military. Loyal MINFAR senior officers were placed in top positions.<sup>5</sup>

In 1990, General Abelardo Colme Ibarra was appointed to head the agency.

### *The “War of All the People” Doctrine*

Since 1980, and especially since the Ochoa Affair, Castro has redoubled his efforts to inculcate a seige mentality in the Cuban population. The people of Cuba are to be the first line of defense for the revolutionary government and, as such, are expected to be involved in gathering and reporting security information. Castro’s doctrine, dubbed the “War of All the People,” stretches back even before the revolution and has been encouraged throughout Castro’s reign. Since the collapse of the USSR, Castro has made the “War of All the People” Cuba’s principal security doctrine. More than national defense is at stake, however. As Leon Goure has observed,

...[the War of All the People] is not so much based on defense consideration[s], but rather primarily on political ones.... It leads to a strengthening of controls over the population, primarily by the [Communist] Party.<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, as Caribbean security expert Isabel Jaramillo Edwards pointed out, the War of All the People doctrine increasingly is linked to economics:

The defense of the country has been integrated into society as part of the rationale for a supreme effort directed towards remodeling and reorganizing the economy and ensuring the viability of the social project. Thus, the correspondence between the economy and the defense apparatus is crucial.<sup>7</sup>

### *The “Special Period in Time of Peace”*

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cuban government declared “a Special Period in Time of Peace,” in which the economy would be run as if the country were at war. Fidel Castro set about adapting the armed

forces to suit the changing environment. The Cuban military thus focused less on exporting revolution and more on countering internal security threats. As a result, MINFAR and MININT have continued to undergo reform. As Phyllis Greene-Walker, of the University of Miami, has pointed out, “With the continuing deterioration in economic conditions since 1990, a number of efforts have been made to bolster internal security and enhance political control.”<sup>8</sup>

The economic challenges to Cuba after the fall of the USSR were (and remain) substantial. Together, MINFAR and MININT have had not only to adapt to a reconfigured post-Cold War strategic environment and a severe economic crisis, but also to prepare for new challenges arising out of possible economic recovery. The Cuban security structure must maintain its operational readiness while at the same time forging a new role in Cuba’s national life. Most internal security tasks have now been placed under the purview of MININT. Thus, as Greene-Walker has said,

Although the MINFAR command scored a coup in bringing MININT under its charge, the FAR’s regular troops... have lost standing in relation to forces under MININT, who have been given increased responsibility for internal security and, presumably, the resources to support their efforts.<sup>9</sup>

The link, then, between economic stability and security already has had an effect on an organizational level and is an increasingly important aspect of Cuban security. The Directorate for General Intelligence in MININT, for example, has become active in obtaining technologies that might be used to enhance the efficiency of the Cuban economy. Similarly, much of the Cuban tourist industry is managed by the armed forces, providing MINFAR with a stable source of funding.

## **Current Security Structure**

### ***Ministry of the Interior (MININT)***

The Ministry of the Interior, headed by General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, is responsible for all aspects of Cuban domestic and foreign intel-

ligence and counter-intelligence. It runs a vast array of Cuban security initiatives and apparatuses, from the national police to foreign intelligence gathering and highly trained special forces.

Active troops in MININT are estimated at 38,500, with an additional 52,000 in reserve, as follows:

National Police	10,000 <sup>10</sup>
Civilian Auxiliary to Police (reserve)	52,000 <sup>11</sup>
State Security (DSE and DGI; details below)	20,000 <sup>12</sup>
Special Operations	2,000 <sup>13</sup>
Border Guard	6,500 <sup>14</sup>

The Ministry of Interior employs four vice-ministers, all military generals, who run the following departments and directorates. For an organizational chart of MININT, see Appendix A.

### *Department for State Security (DSE)*

The Department of State Security coordinates domestic intelligence gathered from MINFAR, the Territorial Militia Troops (MTT), and the police. According to Fermoselle, it is especially active at the local level:

At the provincial level, MININT has [14] provincial headquarters under the direction of a FAR officer of... the rank of [either] brigadier general or colonel. Each provincial headquarters has a Department of State Security, also headed by a FAR officer with the rank of major or above.<sup>15</sup>

The DSE also monitors telephone calls, Internet transmissions, and regular mail, and is responsible for censorship of imported publications and radio transmissions.

### *General Directorate for Intelligence (DGI)*

The DGI, headed by Brigadier General Eduardo Delgado Rodriguez, is responsible for all forms of foreign intelligence collection. The Cuban American Military Council, an organization for former Cuban military officials now living in the United States, has outlined the role of the DGI as follows:

[It] actively recruits within the Cuban exile community and has used refugee flows into the United States to place agents. The DGI collects political, economic, and military information within the United States. More recently, the DGI has started to conduct operations to gain access to technologies required to improve the Cuban economy.... [The DGI and the FAR's Military Counter-Intelligence Department] have been closely associated first with the Soviet and later with Russian intelligence services. The relationship between these services is likely to continue based upon the June 14, 1993, agreement on military cooperation between Russia and Cuba.<sup>16</sup>

Two DGI organizational models have been reported, one by the Cuban American Military Council<sup>17</sup> and one in a Miami Herald article. The latter is derived from court testimony by retired FBI agent Stuart Hoyt, Jr.<sup>18</sup> For a detailed description of these two models, see Appendix B.

### *Directorate of Special Operations*

The 2,000 highly trained special troops in this directorate, headed by Division General Antonio Buzon Batle, are thought to be under the direct command of Fidel Castro.<sup>19</sup> They are responsible for implementation and execution of counterinsurgency plans and for Castro's personal protection during crises.

### *Border Guard Troops*

Cuba's Border Guard patrols coastal areas, focusing on drug trafficking and illegal migration. It also conducts search-and-rescue missions. Its 6,500 personnel are divided into three geographic zones: western, central, and eastern. The Border Guard cooperates closely with MINFAR in operating several coastal artillery garrisons.

### ***Vice-Ministry for Internal Order and Crime Prevention***

The Vice Ministry for Internal Order and Crime Prevention oversees all law enforcement, investigations, and training; the state identity reg-

istry and registration of foreigners; the state penal system; and the national fire department.

The main directorate within this ministry is the National Revolutionary Police (NRP), comprising about 10,000 members. Compulsory military service can be undertaken in either the NRP or MINFAR. NRP is charged with the maintenance of internal order, suppression of dissent, and protection of government offices. Its members can legally conduct “pre-arrest measures,” including surveillance, searches, and detention. For a further description of the structure of the NRP and its place within MININT, and for a description of other directorates included in the Vice-Ministry for Internal Order and Crime Prevention, see Appendix C.

## ***Military Counter-Intelligence***

The Military Counter-Intelligence Department of MINFAR, headed by General Jesus Bermudez Cutiño, collects information on the U.S. armed forces and coordinates Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations with Russian communications systems in Havana. According to the Federation of American Scientists, which analyzes security and intelligence systems around the world, Cuba’s Russian-operated SIGINT station is “capable of monitoring a wide array of commercial and government communications throughout the southeastern United States and between the United States and Europe.”<sup>20</sup>

## ***Territorial Militia Troops (MTT)***

The Territorial Militia Troops (MTT) has just over 1 million volunteer members<sup>21</sup> divided into 10-person units that are amalgamated to form larger squadrons, each responsible for one of 1,300 localities on the island.<sup>22</sup> Yet, according to Cuban military expert Leon Goure, the practical abilities of MTT are debatable: “It appears that the MTT is more often used in demonstration of the ‘people’s readiness for defense,’ which is more of a political than a serious military character.”<sup>23</sup>

Together, the agencies examined above provide the Castro regime with the resources needed to maintain internal order and control in Cuba, often by repressive means. The current security structure, which is bloated, highly politicized, and deficient in accountability, would be untenable in a demo-

cruel Cuba. The model below has been designed to serve as a blueprint for the positive evolution of Cuban security services after a political transformation succeeds in bringing democracy to the island nation.

## A New Model for Cuban Security

In a democratic, post-Castro Cuba, the nation's internal security services will require major changes in both direction and structure. At present, Cuba's structures, as well as the large number of Cubans working for the various security organizations, still reflect Cold War-era threats. In a democracy, the threats facing Cuba will mirror those faced by other countries of the Western Hemisphere. A new civilian security and intelligence structure in Cuba will have to respond effectively to those threats. For an organizational chart of the model proposed below, see Appendix D.

### ***Handling Security Threats***

The first task in maintaining law and order and social peace will be to steer through the period of transition from the Castro regime to a newly elected and democratic leadership. Certain elements within Cuban society, whether on the left or the right of the political spectrum, will question the legitimacy of a new regime if it is perceived to be influenced by foreign powers. Although transitional in nature, at the outset this threat could, if mishandled, lead to severe civil unrest.

As Cuba moves away from the requirement to export and maintain its revolution, threats to the security of Cuba increasingly will parallel those of its regional neighbors.

In addition to traditional threats such as terrorism and foreign intelligence activities, the new Cuba can expect to face economic threats, illegal migration, transnational criminal activities, and emerging threats in the area of critical infrastructure protection, to name but a few. Moreover, Cuba might face issue-based security threats over animal rights and other societal and environmental issues.

Given its close proximity to the United States, Cuba under a more democratic regime naturally could serve as a key transit point for narcotics traffickers. Such a development would offer opportunities for criminal elements to establish themselves in Cuba and take advantage of its geographic position, and would lead to activities inherently associated

with organized crime, including small-arms trade and money laundering. One of the usual side effects of organized crime is corruption of authorities, including politicians, bureaucrats, and law-enforcement officials.

In summary, the major threats to Cuban security under a democratic government are likely to include narcotics trafficking, political instability, terrorism, illegal migration, and corruption.

## ***Overview of the New Model***

The new Cuban security model must respond appropriately to the traditional and emerging security threats outlined above. Given the fact that the threats facing a democratic Cuba would be different in nature from those perceived by the Castro regime, the focus of a new security service would be primarily on the domestic front. For that reason, the activity of gathering of intelligence outside Cuba's borders is not a focus of this study.

Adopting the Canadian model as a blueprint provides a solid foundation on which to base the transformation of the Castro-era security service. The Canadian model is an aggregate established after a review of the structure of several security services around the world. The Canadian model was created by legislation. One of its most important aspects is the clear delineation between investigations of national security matters and of criminal activities. This fundamental separation of responsibilities ensures political control and accountability in the management of the security service. Only the most intrusive investigative tools, in the most sensitive cases, require the approval of the judiciary; this may occur when the service has no option other than to request such extraordinary powers. As in Canada, the security service in Cuba would need to meet stringent legal requirements before using such techniques.

The Cuban security and intelligence mandate should be framed by legislation. Such legislation would constitute the founding document of a new civilian security service and would define, in broad terms, the threats to Cuban national interests that the security service will handle. This act also would empower the service to investigate those threats, using a broad range of investigative techniques and powers while remaining separate from the police.

Unlike the Cuban security apparatus under Castro, which relies heavily on the military, the new security agencies should be run by civilians and should be accountable to elected officials through a number of con-

trol mechanisms. This approach would help to prevent political interference in day-to-day operations, yet would allow for political direction and accountability. Various mechanisms, some internal and others independent, would ensure compliance with legislation and directives issued by the legislature through the political leadership.

In addition, the new security service should be made further accountable for reporting regularly to a committee of elected officials. With appropriate measures in place to protect sensitive information, Cuban citizens should be provided with a broad overview of any threats they face as a society. To reassure the population further, legislation should be enacted as soon as possible to prevent any abuse during the transition period.

## ***Components of the New Model***

National security interests are not the sole responsibility of one arm of the government; those interests are best served through a coordinated approach in which efficient coordination and timely sharing of information are key elements. A remodeled Cuban security and intelligence community would bring together a number of ministries and agencies that fulfill functions inherently linked to public order and safety, under the leadership of following ministries:

- *The Attorney General.* This study assumes that the Attorney General would be the minister responsible for the national police force, Cuba's internal security service, and the justice portfolio.
- *Immigration and Border Control.* The responsibility for immigration and border control would fall under the mandate of this one minister.
- *Foreign Affairs.* This ministry would provide political and economic intelligence to the national government to assist in the development of Cuban foreign policy.
- *National Defense.* This ministry would provide additional resources to support the national police and to deal with national emergencies ranging from natural disasters to armed terrorist attacks.

The above ministries should form the nucleus of the Cuban security and intelligence structure. In addition to managing their respective programs, they would have the added responsibility of contributing to the

pool of intelligence used in coordinating a national response to any given threat. Depending on the nature of the threat, other ministries might be called upon to take part in the response.

Ministries with membership in the security and intelligence community will need to develop policies that will be coherent and comparable in order to facilitate effective cooperation.

The flow of ministerial information related to an issue with national security implications, following in-house analysis, would be shared with other stakeholders in government. At the same time, all information of a national security nature should be shared with a security and intelligence coordinator to ensure that matters are handled at the appropriate level and that coordination among stakeholders takes place before any matter is brought to the attention of the president and/or the Congress.

## **Achieving the New Model**

The creation of a new Cuban security service will be an enormous task, one that could take upwards of a decade to bring to fruition. A transition period will be needed in order to implement the new security and intelligence structures; this will help mitigate any adverse reactions to the process. The transition probably could not be achieved without substantial financial assistance and appropriate advice from other Western Hemisphere nations, including Canada, the United States, Mexico, and perhaps other regional neighbors, and possibly from Spain. This process would involve not only the various national foreign affairs departments and national security and intelligence agencies and organizations, but also academia and the private sector.

An individual or a committee could be selected by the congress and retained to head the transition period and to manage the creation of the new security agencies. This individual/committee should be provided with a model adapted to the Cuban environment. This transition authority would be responsible for establishing the new infrastructure and managing its implementation, using a gradual approach as outlined below.

### ***Phase One: Regime Transition***

In a post-Castro Cuba, the evolution of the proposed new security and intelligence service will proceed through a number of phases. The initial

step would include the actual transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. The critical aspect of this phase is that it will set the foundation, schedule, and tone for the future. The primary challenge of this phase is that it will occur in a very volatile environment.

The new regime will have to deal with this challenge effectively in order to ensure a peaceful social order and a smooth transition to democracy. After decades of regimented life, Cubans will be called upon to make decisions that will set the country's direction for years to come. These measures will require the retirement of the hangers-on of the old regime in order to establish the new leadership. To maintain peace, all Cubans must be involved and feel that they are part of the new Cuba. Except for very senior political, military, and administrative officials who may decide to leave Cuba because of their strong allegiance and ties to Castro and the real or perceived abuse of power they may have exercised on other Cubans, many senior and mid-level officials will have to be integrated into the new Cuban society. This is essential for maintaining social peace.

During the gap between old and new regimes, a series of decrees could drastically reduce the role of the military and could disband both the Territorial Militia Troops and the civilian auxiliary to the police.

According to recent estimates, employees of Cuba's state security apparatus number approximately 20,000. Given the total population of about 11 million, the island's geography, and the threats that would face a new democratic Cuba, the current number of employees clearly is excessive. Canada, with its population of 37 million and its sprawling geography, has only 2,200 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) employees.

At the conclusion of this first phase, some individual involved in the initial transition process may be the ideal candidate to become the first security and intelligence coordinator.

To summarize, Phase One will include these actions: Create an office to manage the transition; remove the top leadership; reduce the size of the service; integrate remaining officials; and involve citizens in drafting legislation.

## ***Phase Two***

The next phase in the evolution of the new security and intelligence service would be a detailed design phase in which key aspects of the service will be mapped out. These include policy development in human

resources and operational and reporting procedures. In addition, this phase will usher in a new doctrine that will govern information sharing and cooperation within the Cuban administration: to serve Cuban national interests. Note that all these reforms must occur within the appropriate legal framework in order to entrench the legitimacy of the service in the eyes of the population.

Under a democratic regime, Cuba would have no need to maintain a large standing military force. The new civilian Cuban Security Service (CSS) therefore will need to shed its reliance on the military establishment. As may already be the case under the current regime, the new CSS will need to recruit from post-secondary institutions. The new service will need expertise in a number of disciplines, including

- Political science
- Economics
- Sociology
- International trade and commerce
- Technology
- Policy development

New recruits, together with those remaining from the old regime, will need to undergo training in counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence in order to gain the skills needed to operate in a democratic environment. Respect for the rule of law and for the protection of human rights should be a cornerstone of the training provided to employees of the new CSS.

Canada's CSIS has developed an expertise and reputation as a leader within the international intelligence community in the field of training for intelligence officers in emerging democracies. CSIS has developed a comprehensive training package providing security and intelligence instruction. The curriculum covers human source recruitment and handling, interviewing, technical operations, intelligence analysis, surveillance using a variety of tools, along with policy development, legal compliance, and respect for human rights. CSIS has concluded formal agreements with other countries to provide such training. A CSIS criterion is that the countries seeking assistance make a formal request and display commitment and respect to human rights. Every request for training assistance must be ratified and supported by Canada's Foreign Affairs Department. This training program could serve as a model for foreign

assistance to Cuba's security intelligence training.

Cuba's intelligence apparatus under Castro has itself provided intelligence training to regional neighbors and has a proven track record in that field. Still, although certain intelligence-gathering and investigative techniques may not change, the focus will shift toward carrying out these responsibilities within a legal framework.

To summarize, Phase Two will include policy development, information sharing, recruitment, and training.

### ***Phase Three***

The third phase will entail a full in-depth review of the activities of the service after its first five years of existence. Given that the CSS will be only one component of a larger Cuban security and intelligence community, the reviewing authority may have to examine other agencies as well.

This review should be conducted by either a congressional committee or an independent commission to be established by Congress. Portions of these hearings would have to be held in camera for obvious security reasons. Subsequently, Cubans should be invited to attend public sessions in which they would be invited to make submissions.

The mandate of the reviewing authority should be to confirm the service's continued relevance in deterring existing and emerging threats.

This review should examine the following aspects:

- Legislation
- Policies and procedures
- Training
- Compliance and accountability
- Funding
- Overall performance

At the conclusion of the five-year review, the reviewing authority will submit public recommendations to Congress within a reasonable time frame.

To summarize, Phase Three will include legislative review, policy review, public consultation, and a public report to Congress.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

A new Cuban security structure must respond effectively to various national security threats. At the same time, it should be governed by appropriate legislation and should be transparent and accountable to the Cuban population. The transition to democracy is often difficult and poses many challenges – including insurrection, instability, and corruption. The effective transformation of government institutions is essential to the development and preservation of a democratic tradition. The following recommendations for a new security structure are designed to help establish such a tradition in Cuba.

### ***Legislation***

It is recommended that the following legislation, with timing and components as indicated, be enacted.

- Draft of Constitution (*in Phase One*)
- Draft of legislation creating government ministries (*Phase One*)
  - Security and intelligence priorities and mandates
- Legislation creating security and intelligence transition office (*Phase One*)
- Legislation regulating the establishment, organization, and control of Cuban security services (*Phase One*), including
  - Priorities and mandates
  - Ministerial responsibility
  - Structure of agencies
    - Directorates and other offices
    - Internal reporting procedures
  - Policies and procedures (*Phase Two*)
    - Guarantees of secrecy
    - Limits of secrecy and investigative powers
  - Reporting procedures (*Phase Two*)
    - To committees
    - To the president
    - To Congress
  - Human resources (*Phase Two*)
    - Procedures for appointment to posts
    - Delegation of power and responsibility

- Salary scale and conditions of employment
    - Promotion practices
    - Misconduct and discipline
  - Internal review mechanisms
  - External review mechanisms
    - Reports to Congress
  - Funding procedures
- Review of legislation (*Phase Three*)
- In-camera review
  - Public consultation
  - Review of all aspects of security services
  - Public report to Congress

## ***Structure***

Implementation of the following structure is recommended:

### ***Ministries with Security and Intelligence Roles***

- Ministry of Attorney General
  - National Police Force
    - Responsible for investigation of criminal matters
    - Referral to courts for prosecution
    - Internal review board, auditor, and complaints commission
  - Cuban Security Service
    - Responsible for internal security and counter-intelligence
    - Internal review board and auditor
  - Reports regularly to Security and Intelligence Coordinator
  - Reports to Security and Intelligence Committee four times annually (See committee description below.)
  - Minister reports to president and Congress
- Ministry of National Defense
  - Provides additional resources to support National Police Force
    - On a case-by-case basis only
  - Deals with national emergencies, from natural disasters to armed terrorist attacks

- Reports regularly to Security and Intelligence Coordinator
- Reports to Security and Intelligence Committee four times annually
- Minister reports to president and Congress
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  - Provides political and economic intelligence to the national government to assist in developing Cuban foreign policy
  - Reports regularly to Security and Intelligence Coordinator
  - Reports to Security and Intelligence Committee four times annually
  - Minister reports to president and Congress
- Ministry of Immigration and Border Control
  - Immigration
    - Manages and processes immigration and refugee claimants
  - Border Authority
    - Works with police to combat narcotics trafficking
  - Reports regularly to Security and Intelligence Coordinator
  - Reports to Security and Intelligence Committee four times annually
  - Minister reports to president and Congress

### *Committees and Coordinators*

- Security and Intelligence Committee
  - Deputy ministers meet four times annually
  - Sets security and intelligence priorities and direction
  - Manages and oversees programs that fall under the responsibility of the respective ministers
  - Ensures that information is exchanged and that liaison takes place with other departments that have a role to play in security and intelligence
- Security and Intelligence Coordinator/Coordination Committee
  - Temporary position to manage transition
- Committee of Ministers
  - Meets on an annual basis to set priorities based on current geopolitical, economic, and social environment

## *Human Resources*

- Removal of senior leadership
  - Generals and colonels loyal to Castro to be removed from office
- Integration of remaining staff into new structure
- Recruitment
  - Candidates from post-secondary institutions in the following areas of expertise:
    - Political science
    - Economics
    - Sociology
    - International trade and commerce
    - Technology
    - Policy development
- Training (For a detailed curriculum proposal, see Appendix E.)
  - Initial and continuing training in the following:
    - Accountability
    - Operations
    - Training the trainers
    - Administration
    - External relations
    - Regional cooperation
  - Continuing training
  - Establishment of training facilities

## **ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW**


It is recommended that the following accountability and compliance mechanisms be implemented.

- Cuban Security Service
  - External review
    - Permanent independent review committee
      - Appointed by Congress with consultation from all sides
      - Reports directly to Minister of Attorney General
      - Presents report to Congress on a regular basis (in

- public, with consideration for confidential information)
- Has access to all information under service control
- Reviews the following:
  - Public complaints
  - Lines of responsibility and authority
  - Overall performance of duties and functions
  - Security clearance appeals
- Internal review
  - Inspector General
    - Reviews compliance with internal policy
    - Reviews operational activities
    - Reports to the Minister of the Attorney General
      - Copy of report to external review committee
- National Police Force
  - Permanent independent review committee (as above)
  - Inspector General (as above)
- All security and intelligence agencies should be subject to other independent review committees, such as:
  - Auditor General
  - Privacy Commissioner
  - Treasury Board

In addition to the specific elements noted above, policies should be established on a continuous basis, and training should be instituted to ensure that high standards are achieved. In addition, a system of auditing will assure that high standards are maintained.

## Appendix A: MININT Organizational Chart



## **Appendix B: Structure of MININT's General Directorate for Intelligence (DGI)**

### **The Cuban American Military Council Model for DGI**

The General Directorate for Intelligence (DGI) has six divisions, divided into two categories of roughly equal size, the Operational Divisions and the Support Divisions:

#### ***Operational Divisions***

##### *Political/Economic Intelligence Division*

Eastern Europe North America

Western Europe

Africa-Asia-Latin America

##### *External Counter-Intelligence Division*

Has responsibility for penetrating foreign intelligence services and for the surveillance of the exile community

##### *Military Intelligence Division*

Collects information on the U.S. armed forces and coordinates SIGINT (satellite) operations with Russia

### **Support Divisions**

##### *Technical Support Division*

Produces of false documents, handles communications systems supporting clandestine operations, and develops clandestine message capabilities

##### *Information Division*

Handles intelligence analysis functions

##### *Preparation Division*

Handles intelligence analysis functions

## **The DGI Model Reported in the *Miami Herald*, January 2001**

Within the DGI are eight departments whose names all start with the letter M, followed by one or more Roman numerals, as follows:

- 1) MX is the office of the DGI's chief, Brigadier General Eduardo Delgado Rodriguez.
- 2) MI is responsible for infiltrating U.S. government agencies.
- 3) MIII collects and analyzes all information coming into the DI.
- 4) MV supports "illegal" intelligence officers, or those who enter the United States illegally.
- 5) MIX takes "active measures," which refers to the use of disinformation, threats, and violence to discredit enemies or otherwise influence people's actions.
- 6) MXI monitors telephone calls and airplane radio communications.
- 7) MXV handles communications between Havana and agents in the United States.
- 8) MXIX infiltrates "counter-revolutionary" Cuban exile groups that oppose the Castro regime.

## **Appendix C: Vice-Ministry of Internal Order and Crime Prevention**

### **General Directorate of the National Revolutionary Police (DGNRP)**

Political Section

- Criminal Investigations Office
- Central Criminology Laboratory
- Embassy Protection Unit

Public Safety Office

- Police Training Department
- Department of Analysis and Planning

Department of Crime Prevention

### **Civilian Auxiliary Corps to National Revolutionary Police**

Troop strength: 52,000

### **General Directorate for Counter-Intelligence**

Directorate of Identification and Information

- Registration of Foreign Residents

### **National ID Card and Population Registration Section**

Parents are required to enroll newborns in the identity register of MININT. Each infant is assigned a version of the national identification (ID) card, which must be carried by the parents at all times under penalty of arrest. At 16 years of age, every citizen receives an adult version of the national ID card. The identity register contains a list of prior addresses and schools, plus notations describing political attitudes and conduct.

### **General Directorate for Penal Establishments**

### **General Directorate for Fire Fighting and Prevention**

### **General Directorate for Immigration and Naturalization**

**National Protection Directorate**

State Secrets and Physical Security

Physical Security for Construction Sites


Directorate for Personal Security

**Directorate for Training and Cadres**

**Directorate of Instruction**

**Directorate of Construction**

**Appendix D: Proposed Cuban Security Service – Organizational Chart**



## **Appendix E: Training Modules and Curricula**

Training should be provided to senior officials, preferably at the director and director general levels, in a number of critical areas. The purpose of the training is to build capacity in the areas of operations and support and to create a critical mass for strategic planning and development in the following areas.

### **Accountability**

#### ***Goals***

- To emphasize the role of accountability in promoting the three “E’s” – efficiency, effectiveness, and economy
- To stress the importance of accountability within the context of a civil society
- To provide an overview of the elements of a “system of accountability” and the process necessary for its implementation

#### ***Curriculum Topics***

- Introduction to terms and concepts
- Source(s) of authority
  - Legislation, ministerial order, senior management directive, and so on
  - The chain of accountability
- The tools of accountability
- Oversight
- Maintenance of oversight system

### **Operations**

#### ***Goals***

- To provide the directors of operations with operational models that promote effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency
- To emphasize core competencies at various levels of security and

- intelligence operations and to underline the importance of a coherent organizational vision promoting progress toward a viable security model
- To strengthen strategic planning, change management, and leadership skills

## ***Curriculum Topics***

- Competencies within the ranks
  - Operational issues and concerns
  - Identifying core competencies
- Focus on key competencies
  - Leadership
  - Planning
  - Change management
  - Staffing/personnel
  - Team building
  - Communications
- Operational planning
  - Foundations of planning
  - The planning process
  - Elements of operations
- Elements of an operations division
  - Operational units
  - Support units
  - Schedule of service
  - Policies
  - General procedures
  - Special procedures
  - Special units

## ***Training***

### ***Goals***

- To develop strategies for the design and delivery of training systems aimed at furthering the effectiveness of security forces
- To identify key training issues through a needs assessment

- To do strategic planning for implementation or reform of training delivery systems
- To develop curriculum and evaluate programs

## ***Curriculum Topics***

- Defining the issues
  - Issues and concerns
  - Importance of a strategic planning approach to training
- Concepts and purposes
- Strategic approach to planning
  - Assessing training needs
  - Task analysis, data requirements, and trainee groups
- Developing a curriculum
  - Setting training objectives by level/rank/function
  - Identifying appropriate types of training by level/rank/function
  - Forms of training and their uses/objectives
- Focus on the trainer
  - Selection and development
- Developing a training regimen
  - Planning and producing the programs
  - Program evaluation
- Issues and responses
  - Anticipating reactions
- Regional cooperation
- Designing a training delivery structure

## ***Administration***

### ***Goals***

- To summarize basic organizational principles underlying effective and transparent police administration, and to highlight the importance of strategic planning in implementing them
- To enhance financial management and accountability, information technology and record keeping, property and evidence control, asset management, and human resources planning and administration

## ***Curriculum Topics***

- Defining the issues
  - Security and intelligence issues and concerns
  - Common problems and concerns
  - Centrality of change
  - Importance of strategic approaches to administrative reform
- Concepts and purposes
- Leadership and management in administration
- Leaders and managers
  - Roles of leaders and managers
  - Competencies, skills, and styles
- The functions of management
  - Functions overview
  - Visioning
  - Setting objectives
  - Planning
  - Implementation
- Evaluating the administration
  - Standards of administration
- Components of an administrative system
- Applying the principles of administration
  - Human resources management
  - Financial administration
  - Information technology
  - Property and evidence control
  - Asset management
- Putting it all together
  - Planning for quality assurance

## **External Relations**

### ***Goals***

- To enhance security service-civil authority relations
- To assure media and communications training
- To enhance relations with civil society

## ***Curriculum Topics***

- Defining the issues
  - Security issues and concerns
  - Problems and concerns surrounding the impact of the transition from military model to civil model
  - New relationships and partnerships
- Civil society – the context
- Fundamental principles of civil security: consent of the governed, service orientation, separation of powers, legislation-based governance, transparent checks and balances, professionalization, positioning at arm's-length from government
- Values and vision
  - The nature of change
  - The role of values and vision in the process of change
  - Development of a set of values and a model vision statement
- Relationships
  - The relational universe
  - The security-government relationship
  - The security-community relationship
    - Civilian oversight
- Communications
  - Security-media relations
  - Communications in general
  - Development of an appropriate communications plan
- Building partnerships
- Putting it all together

## **Regional Cooperation**

### ***Goals***

- To promote and facilitate regional cooperation in security and intelligence gathering and investigations
- To introduce strategies for inter-service communication and information sharing, and coordination of efforts in all areas – administration, operations, and training, plus transnational, cross-border security issues

## ***Curriculum Topics***

- Defining issues and concerns
- Regional relationships in a democratic, civil society
  - Jurisdictional issues
  - Models for comparison
  - Agreements, policies, and so on
- Principles of cooperation
  - Governance
    - Short-term
    - Continuing
- Strategic planning
- Internal marketing
- Resource identification

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## **About the Project Team**

The Justice Solutions project team included senior associates in the fields of project design and research, security and intelligence, and training and development.

Eugene Rothman, Ph.D., president of Justice Solutions, who is responsible for the design of the organization's projects in the field of peacekeeping, security, policing, and intelligence in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, served as project leader for this study.

Bernard Barbe, formerly with the Canadian Intelligence and Security Service and the Office of the Solicitor General of Canada, who now is a Justice Solutions senior associate in the field of security and intelligence, helped design this project's overall approach to policies and procedures.

Col. Gordon Graham (CF ret.), recently retired as director of plans and policies in the Canadian Forces' Intelligence Branch (J2) and now a Justice Solutions senior consultant, helped construct the organizational framework for the proposed security service model within the broader context of intergovernmental relationships.

Marvin Schiff, vice president of training, who is responsible for the design of all Justice Solutions training programs, designed the detailed training framework for senior members of the proposed Cuban Security Service.

Christopher Walker, a senior writer/researcher with Justice Solutions, who has worked on company projects dealing with the Middle East peace process and Africa-based efforts served as senior researcher and writer on this project.

## **Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies - ICCAS**

The Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies is unique in that ICCAS is a leading Center for Cuban Studies emphasizing the dissemination of Cuban history and culture. ICCAS sponsors academic and outreach programs and helps coordinate Cuban-related activities at the University of Miami including the Casa Bacardi; the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Chair in Cuban Studies; the Cuba Transition Project; the Cuban Heritage Collection at Otto G. Richter Library; the John J. Koubek Memorial Center, and other University components related to Cuban and Cuban-American Studies.

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The Institute undertakes a variety of programs and activities, including sponsoring and hosting public lectures and seminars. The Institute's Information Center provides current and historical information on Cuba and responds to requests from the academic, business, media and government communities. ICCAS publishes research studies and occasional papers, sponsors original research, and coordinates interdisciplinary courses at the University of Miami. The Institute also organizes art exhibits, musical programs, and an annual film festival.

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